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In recent years, electronic health records (EHR) have been combined with genetic data to 
uncover disease biology and accelerate generation of hypotheses for drug development and 
treatment strategies. The goal of this dissertation is to develop novel statistical models that can 
address the challenges of analyzing ‘imperfect’ EHR data and to propose privacy-preserving 
methods that enable sensitive individual-level data sharing across EHR studies and other large 
genetic studies. 
In Chapter II, we propose a statistical method to address misclassified clinical outcomes, a 
common challenge in EHR data. One essential step of EHR-based genome-wide association 
studies is constructing a cohort of cases and controls for a specific disease from billing codes and 
other clinical or administrative data. Nearly always, a perfect strategy for deriving disease 
phenotypes from billing codes is not available, resulting in some incorrect case/control labels. 
Here, we propose a method to estimate the misclassification of case/control status by examining 
genotype information of dozens of disease associated loci. Through simulation and application to 
the Michigan Genomics Initiative data, we demonstrate that the method enables the evaluation of 
new EHR-based phenotype definition schemes and provides accurate estimates of disease 
association measures when phenotypes are misclassified. 
In Chapters III and IV, we focus on identifying overlapping samples between studies, a common 
challenge when aggregating information across datasets. We particularly focus on identifying 
duplicate or related samples when sharing the underlying individual level genetic data is 
restricted. We propose methods that do not require disclosure of individual identities but 
xvi 
 
that can still identify genetic relatives across datasets. In Chapter III, we show that by grouping 
genotypes into segments and calculating summary statistics within each segment, we are able to 
obscure and encode individual-level genetic information. Relatives can be inferred with the 
coded genotypes using a likelihood model. Simulation and application to the Trans-Omics for 
Precision Medicine (TOPMed) program data demonstrate the utility and security of the method. 
In Chapter IV, we extend the method further, with a strategy that guarantees stronger encryption 
and is expected to work across heterogeneous populations. This secure protocol can infer genetic 
relatives among people of diverse ethnic backgrounds. The method works by combining a 
cryptographic technique, homomorphic encryption, with the robust relationship inference 
method previously described by Manichaikul et al (2010). Through simulations, we show that 
our method's performance is identical to that of implementations that use the original 
unencrypted genotypes. Our protocol scales well in computing time and is protected from several 
possible attacks. The secure protocol was again applied to TOPMed dataset. Securely identifying 
related samples will facilitate combination of results across datasets when there are restrictions to 
sharing the underlying individual level data. 
In conclusion, the methods developed here well enhance use of EHR data and genome data to 
improve accuracy of case/control status as well as decrease inclusion of relatives across studies 









1.1 Combining EHR with genetic studies  
Combining the clinical data in electronic health records (EHR) with genetic data provides us a 
chance to accelerate the pace of genomic discovery on thousands of traits. The idea of combining 
DNA repositories with EHR raises the possibility that the EHR can be used in genomic research 
to replicate or discover genotype–phenotype associations (Denny et al., 2013; Jensen et al., 2012; 
Bush et al., 2016). Efforts have been devoted to link genetic data to EHR in many research 
programs. For example, the Electronic Medical Records and Genomics (eMERGE) Network has 
been funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) since 2007 (McCarty et al., 2011). The 
University of Michigan (UM) established the Michigan Genomics Initiative, which collects 
genotype data and EHR of patients undergoing surgery in the UM hospital. Previously, some 
small-scale EHR studies have demonstrated that EHR-based genome-wide association studies 
(GWAS) or phenome-wide association studies (PheWAS) have the ability to replicate genotype-
phenotype associations as well as to uncover novel associations (Denny et al., 2013; Ritchie et al., 
2013). Large cohorts can be gathered quickly and inexpensively from EHR. This advantage, as 
well as the reduced genotyping costs, has promoted the establishment of large biobanks, like the 
UK Biobank (Sudlow et al., 2015; Bycroft et al., 2018). Combining EHR-based phenotypes with 
the genotype data in the UK Biobank allows us to investigate associations of half a million 
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samples with thousands of diseases (Zhou et al., 2018; Nielsen et al., 2018; Wolford et al., 
2018).  
In addition to being used for GWAS and PheWAS, EHR have also been linked to sequencing 
data, for example, the exome sequencing project of UK Biobank samples funded by Regeneron 
Pharmaceuticals (UK Biobank, 2018).These sequencing data of large cohorts can be used to 
establish the reference dataset that is the critical resource for functional interpretation of putative 
disease-causing variants. Multiple similar reference resources, like dbSNP and ClinVar, or 
custom browsers like gnomAD and BRAVO, are becoming publicly available (Sherry et al., 
2001; Landrum et al., 2017; Taliun et al., 2019; Karczewski et al., 2019). Aggregated 
information from multiple reference resources will help researchers make inference more 
efficiently and comprehensively. However, while the summaries like EHR-based GWAS results 
and allele frequencies (AFs) are often shared between reference datasets, studies are usually 
prohibited from sharing their underlying individual-level data with each other. In order to 
aggregate information, a vital step, then, is to infer the overlapping samples between studies. Due 
to the data sharing barriers, identifying genetic relatives between studies can be challenging. 
Overall, incorporating genetic information into EHR brings both opportunities and challenges in 
many subject areas, including statistics, biology, medical science and computer science, and 
often requires interdisciplinary knowledge to adequately understand the problems and devise 
appropriate solutions. For statisticians, valid statistical analysis for large-scale EHR is one of the 
most important concerns. In this dissertation, we address challenging problems in EHR studies 
related to data misspecification as well as data privacy. Reliable and efficient solutions to some 
of the most important problems related to EHR studies are proposed, solutions which are general 
and therefore applicable to other genetic studies. 
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1.2 Challenges of analyzing EHR data 
EHR data has several problems that may bias results if conventional statistical methods are 
applied. Moreover, conventional methods may not even be useable for certain purposes. In this 
section, we describe several problems that should be considered when dealing with EHR data, 
and for which we will propose methodological solutions in the following chapters. 
1.2.1 Misclassification 
One essential step of EHR-based GWAS is constructing a cohort of cases and controls for a 
specific disease, using EHR billing codes. However, a perfect rule of pooling redundant billing 
codes to phenotype codes is often lacking, leading to incorrect case/control outcome labels. In 
addition, the errors in the billing codes themselves that occur in every step of these codes’ 
assignment also lead to the misclassification (O'malley et al.,2005). Ignoring the misclassified 
phenotypes can bias the association results and mislead drug and treatment research (Neuhaus, 
1999; Copeland et al, 1977). For example, when we conducted preliminary GWAS of ~1500 
diseases using Michigan Genomics Initiative (MGI) data, which is a collaborative study at the 
University of Michigan pairing patients’ EHR and genetics information, we detected potential 
misclassification of several phenotypes like type II diabetes (T2D). 
To correct the estimated effect size and increase the power of the association test in EHR GWAS 
when misclassification is present, several methods have been developed. Magder and Hughes 
(1997) proposed an unsupervised algorithm called iteratively reweighted least square algorithm 
to estimate misclassification rate. This method can estimate the misclassification without the 
identification of gold standard samples. However, due to the flat surface of the likelihood, this 
method cannot guarantee the convergence to the estimation that maximizes the likelihood in 
practice (Hong et al, 2019). Sinnott et al. (2014) also proposed a method that does not require 
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knowledge of the gold standard sample. Algorithms based on this method can calculate a 
sample-specific probability of having the disease. This method was shown to improve the test 
power and odds ratio estimation. However, it has limited generalizability, and the algorithms 
have only been developed for certain diseases like rheumatoid arthritis and Crohn's disease (Liao 
et al., 2010; Carroll et al., 2012; Ananthakrishnan et al., 2013). 
In addition to these unsupervised methods, some supervised or semi-supervised methods have 
been developed (Duffy et al., 2004; Gordon et al, 2004; McDavid et al., 2013; Hong et al, 2019). 
These methods were shown to estimate misclassification with relatively higher accuracy and 
have wider generalizability compared with the unsupervised methods. However, they require 
identifying a set of gold standard samples with correctly specified case and control labels. 
Generating gold standard samples from EHR data, even a small set, requires cumbersome record 
review by doctors and specialists. 
1.2.2 Security 
Communication between different EHR studies and other sequencing studies may allow us to 
aggregate information of more data and conduct more powerful analyses. Inferring genetic 
relatives between studies is one critical step to achieve this goal. Ignoring the closely related 
samples will bias the aggregated information result in inaccurate interpretation of downstream 
analyses. For example, when the overlapping samples are enriched for a rare variants, AF of this 
variant in the joint population will be overestimated if we do not consider the overlapping 
information. In addition, for the meta-analysis of multiple GWAS, ignoring the overlaps among 
studies can lead to inflated type I error and false signals. However, studies are often prohibited 
from sharing individual-level data with each other due to privacy issues.  
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Homer et al. (2008) showed that given an individual’s DNA information we can easily discover 
if he/she is involved in a GWAS. In general, various strategies and technologies have been 
developed to address genetic privacy problem in different areas of genetic studies. One widely 
accepted strategy is the dbGAP access control (Mailman et al., 2007), which protects genetic 
data by placing it in a secure location that is only accessible to people having the permission. 
Another strategy is data anonymization. Differential privacy is a typical method based on this 
idea. It adds reasonable noise to the summary statistic before its release. Several studies have 
shown that the individual information will not be revealed in the released summary statistics 
using the differential privacy technique (Uhlerop et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2014). Moreover, many 
privacy-preserving methods have been developed based on modern cryptographic solutions. For 
example, homomorphic encryption allows people to predict their disease susceptibility on the 
cloud using their encrypted genotype so that they do not need to disclose their true genetic data 
(Ayday et al., 2013). Although potential risks of sharing genetic data as well as techniques to 
protect data privacy have been widely developed, a state-of-the-art solution to deal with this 
specific problem, secure relationship inference, is still lacking. 
1.3 Summary of objectives 
With a focus on these challenges, this dissertation will propose methodologies to achieve the 
following analytical objectives: 
1) Build a model that can estimate misclassified cases/controls in electronic health records; 




These two objectives are addressed in the proposed methods in Chapter II (Objective 1) and 
Chapters III and Chapter IV (Objective 2). More details on the background, pertinent literature, 




Modeling Misclassified Phenotypes in Electronic Health 
Records Using Genotype Information 
2.1 Introduction 
Genome-wide association studies (GWAS) have successfully uncovered relationships between 
genetic factors with thousands of human traits; many of these associations between phenotypes 
and genetic variants require further replication. Since cohorts can be gathered efficiently from 
electronic health records (EHR), by combining genetic data with EHR, researchers have been 
able to accelerate the replication or discovery of genotype–phenotype associations (Jensen et al., 
2012; Denny et al., 2013; Bush et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2018; Nielsen et al., 2018).  
To perform an EHR-based GWAS, one starts by constructing a collection of cases and controls 
for a specific phenotype from the EHR data. A traditional approach for phenotyping is manual 
chart review, which has been successfully applied to EHR data (Wilke et al, 2005). However, 
this method is time-consuming and cumbersome and cannot generate large cohorts easily. The 
billing codes, International Classification of Disease (ICD-9-CM) codes, in EHR are more 
commonly used to generate cases and controls (Denny et al., 2010; Denny et al., 2013; Ritchie et 
al., 2013). ICD-9-CM codes contain lists of codes corresponding to diagnoses and procedures 
recorded in conjunction with hospital care. ICD-9-CM codes are usually not necessarily direct 
surrogates for a phenotype as several ICD-9-CM codes may describe the same disease. For
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 examples, ICD code 250.00, 250.02 and eight more codes all denote to type II diabetes. 
Moreover, defining the control samples for a certain disease is not straightforward. Therefore, 
well-defined electronic phenotyping algorithms using ICD-9-CM codes, e.g. PheWAS, have 
been developed to dichotomize phenotypes (Denny et al., 2013). By pooling redundant billing 
codes to PheWAS codes, we can increase the sample size of cases as well as define a reliable set 
of controls. 
However, even with these phenotyping algorithms, phenotyping remains challenging. Due to its 
billing purpose, EHR can be too flawed for scientific research. PheWAS phenotypes defined 
using ICD-9-CM codes usually have imperfect sensitivity, because of inherent variations in the 
coding scheme itself and variation in how healthcare providers assign the codes to patients 
(O'malley et al., 2005). Such inaccuracies typically affect the GWAS/PheWAS results by biasing 
results toward the null hypothesis (Neuhaus, 1999; Copeland et al, 1977). In fact, the effect sizes 
for EHR-based associations were typically closer to zero than those found in other large-scale 
GWAS. Even though this phenomenon may be due to the “winner’s curse,” such that the GWAS 
in which the association was first discovered often overestimates the true effect size, it may also 
be evidence of phenotype misclassification in EHR-defined case/control status (Bazerman and 
Samuelson, 1983; Lohmueller et al., 2003). 
We detected such potential misclassification of phenotypes when analyzing Michigan Genomics 
Initiative (MGI) data, which is a collaborative study of the University of Michigan, pairing 
patients’ EHR and genetics information to gain novel biomedical insights. Around 1500 
phenotypes were constructed from ICD-9-CM codes through the PheWAS R package(Carroll et 
al., 2014). Both GWAS and PheWAS analysis were conducted on the enriched information on 
those traits using over 7.7M common genetic variants. The association results are displayed in 
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the PheWeb browser, http://pheweb.sph.umich.edu/. While several well-known genetic 
associations were successfully replicated, we observed thoroughly attenuated effect sizes in some 
traits, which may result from misclassification of the phenotypes, like age-related macular 
degeneration (AMD) and type II diabetes.  
As described in Chapter I, both unsupervised and supervised methods have been developed to 
estimate the misclassification rate and correct the estimated effect size to increase the power of 
the association test in EHR GWAS (Magder and Hughes 1997; Duffy et al., 2004; Gordon et al, 
2004; Liao et al., 2010; Carroll et al., 2012; Ananthakrishnan et al., 2013; McDavid et al., 2013; 
Sinnott et al. 2014; Hong et al, 2019). The unsupervised methods have disadvantages that either 
cannot guarantee the convergence to the maximum likelihood estimates in practice or have 
limited generality. While having better performance of estimating misclassification rates, the 
supervised methods need a time-consuming set of gold standard samples to train the model.    
In this chapter, we propose a method to make inferences of the misclassification rate in the 
phenotype when gold standard samples are not available. Taking advantage of combining genetic 
data with EHR, we construct a maximum likelihood estimator to make inferences of the 
misclassification rate in cases/controls incorporating genotype information. Our approach is 
based on the insight that external GWAS without misclassification having similar ascertainment 
and design as our study can be a gold standard for the EHR GWAS. The effect sizes of genetic 
variants in our study should be similar to those in the external GWAS. Thus, we can estimate the 
misclassification rate by examining genotype information of dozens of disease-associated loci 
found by other large-scale GWAS.  
Through extensive simulation studies and analysis of MGI data, we demonstrate that the 
proposed method can provide estimated misclassification rates with high accuracy under 
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scenarios of different misclassification rates, disease prevalence, and sample sizes. In addition, 
through evaluating different EHR-based case definition schemes, we can provide guidance about 
what is the best scheme to define cases for certain phenotypes. Moreover, knowing the 
misclassification rate in cases/controls will benefit the downstream analysis in many ways. First 
we can correct the effect size estimation with the misclassification rate using the formula derived 
by Neuhaus (1999) or Duffy's approach (2004) or using the iteratively reweighted least square 
algorithm (Magder and Hughes, 1997). In addition, the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
curve analysis can also be corrected using the misclassification rate (Zawistowski et al.,2017). 
Thus, combining our method with EHR-based GWAS and PheWAS analysis can help reduce the 
bias in the search across large numbers of phenotypes to broadly replicate and discover GWAS 
associations in EHR-based cohorts and enhance analysis of the genomic basis of human disease.  
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Likelihood formulation 
We have data of a binary trait and genotypes of n individuals. Let 𝐷𝑖 denote true disease status 
and 𝑮𝒊 denote the vector of genotypes of the ith individual. For each variant j, 𝐺𝑖𝑗 can either be 
genotype taking value {0, 1, 2} or imputed genotype dosage. Here we only consider known risk 
variants that are associated with disease. In other words, 𝑮𝒊 only represents the genotype of 
known independent risk variants that have been discovered by previous large-scale GWAS. Let 
𝑿𝒊 denote a set of covariates (e.g., demographic variables and principal components for ancestry). 
We relate 𝑫 to 𝑮 and 𝑿 through a generalized linear model with logistic link function,  
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋𝑖) = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘  , 
where 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑖 = 1|𝑮𝒊, 𝑿𝒊). 
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However, we do not observe the true response 𝐷 directly but an error-corrupted response 𝑌. Let 
𝛼0 and 𝛼1 denote the specificity and sensitivity of measurement of 𝑌 respectively.Then 1 − 𝛼0 
and 1 − 𝛼1 correspond to the probabilities of misclassification of the controls and cases in Y. 
Here we assume misclassification does not depend on the genotype and other covariates since the 
construction of the phenotype from EHR does not consider this information. In addition, we 
assume the misclassification is non-differentiable, which means 𝛼0 and 𝛼1 are the same for each 
sample. So that 
 1 − 𝛼0 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝐷𝑖 = 0, 𝑮𝒊, 𝑿𝒊) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝐷𝑖 = 0) 
  1 − 𝛼1 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖 = 0|𝐷𝑖 = 1, 𝑮𝒊, 𝑿𝒊) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖 = 0|𝐷𝑖 = 1). 
Then the model for the observed phenotype Y can be calculated by taking the integral on the 
underlying true disease status D, 
            𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑮𝒊, 𝑿𝒊) = ∑ 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝐷𝑖 = 𝑑, 𝑮𝒊, 𝑿𝒊) ∗𝑑=0,1 𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑖 = 𝑑|𝑮𝒊, 𝑿𝒊).                 
Assuming the n samples are independent, the likelihood for observed data 𝒀, 𝑮 and 𝑿 should be 
𝐿(𝒀, 𝑮, 𝑿; 𝛼0, 𝛼1, 𝜷, 𝜸)                                                                                                                              
= ∏{𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑮𝒊, 𝑿𝒊) ∗ 𝑃𝑟(𝑮𝒊, 𝑿𝒊)}




∝ ∏ 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑮𝒊, 𝑿𝒊)




Note that as 𝑃𝑟(𝑮𝒊, 𝑿𝒊) does not contain the parameter 𝛼 of interest, it can be factored out.  
In the following analysis, for simplicity, we fix 𝛼1 to be 1, assuming there is no misclassification 
of cases in the control group. We only focus on estimating 𝛼0. One reason is that for most of the 
population-based diseases studies, the case/control ratio is not balanced. Usually, we have many 
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more controls than cases. As a consequence, even a small amount of misclassification in controls 
has a large impact on the association results while the misclassified cases typically have little 
impact. Therefore, we are more interested in the misclassified controls mixed in the cases. 
Then the likelihood becomes 
𝐿(𝒀, 𝑮, 𝑿; 𝛼0, 𝛼1, 𝜷, 𝜸) 
∝ ∏[𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑖 = 1|𝑮𝒊, 𝑿𝒊) + (1 − 𝛼0) Pr(𝐷𝑖 = 0|𝑮𝒊, 𝑿𝒊)]




According to the logit model defined above, we have 
(𝐷𝑖 = 1|𝑮𝒊, 𝑿𝒊) =
exp (𝛽0+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘 )
1+exp (𝛽0+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘 )
 ,  𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑖 = 0|𝑮𝒊, 𝑿𝒊) =
1
1+exp (𝛽0+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘 )
.  
2.2.2 Incorporation of external GWAS information and parameter estimation 
The model contains parameters, 𝛼0, 𝜷 and 𝜸. Here, we assume the external GWAS with reliable 
phenotype to be the gold standard. Rather than estimating the parameter β, we borrow 
information of the effect sizes from external gold standard GWAS results and fix (𝛽1, 𝛽2, … , 𝛽𝐽)  
as the known effect sizes of the associated variants. By so doing, we are able to reduce the 
dimension of the parameters by the number of associated variants, 𝐽. This is valid under the 
assumption that effect sizes of disease-associated loci in our study are similar to those in the 
external gold standard GWAS.   
The cohort of the external gold standard GWAS should be similar as our EHR study in terms of 
ancestry, gender, age, and other demographic factors. In order to get a reliable list of known 
variants, we suggest applying the following criteria: 1) filtering out ethnicity-specific variants; 2) 
selecting independent variants within each locus; 3) using effect sizes from replication studies 
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rather than discovery studies to avoid the ”winner's curse” (Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983; 
Lohmueller et al., 2003). 
Then parameters can be estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood. This is a smooth nonlinear 
optimization problem. We solve the problem using "Augmented Lagrangian Adaptive Barrier 
Minimization Algorithm," which is implemented in an R package called "alabama." It has been 
shown that this algorithm can guarantee the convergence to the local minimum (Lange, 2004; 
Madsen et al., 2004). In order to increase the chance of achieving the global minimum, we 
randomly pick 10 initial points and choose the estimate that gives the maximum likelihood.    
2.2.3 Inference of specificity 
Once the estimation of the specificity, 𝛼0 is obtained using the above method, we draw the 
inference regarding 𝛼0 by testing for significance of 𝛼0̂. We test the point null hypothesis 𝛼0 = 1, 
which indicates there is no misclassification: 
H0: 𝛼0 = 1 vs. H1: 𝛼0 < 1. 
The likelihood ratio test is chosen because it generally has better power than other tests like the 
Wald test and the score test (Casella and Berger, 2001). Furthermore, the distribution of the test 
statistic under the null hypothesis has been calibrated well when the test is done on the parameter 
space boundary (Self and Liang, 1987). The explicit formula of the log likelihood ratio test 
statistic is as follows:  





where 𝜃 is MLE of the parameters and 𝜃0̂ is the MLE of the parameters under 𝛼0 = 1 constraint. 
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Since 𝛼0 ∈ [0,1], we are testing a parameter on the boundary of the parameter space. Self and 
Liang (1987) theoretically showed that the above statistic  Λ has an asymptotic mixed chi-square 




Finally, the variance/covariance matrix of the parameter estimates can be approximated in a 
standard way using the inverse of the information matrix when the true 𝛼0 is not 0 or 1. This 
matrix can be expressed in a relatively simple formula, which is provided in the Supplementary 
note. 
2.3 Simulation studies 
2.3.1 Estimation accuracy of parameters under scenarios with different sample sizes 
and disease prevalence 
In the first section of the simulation, we examine the estimation accuracy of specificity in 
different settings. Genotypes of 300, 500, 1000 and 5000 samples are generated based on the 
allele frequencies (AFs) of 51 independent variants reported in a large-scale GWAS paper of 
AMD (Fritsche et al., 2016). We exclude one rare variant with extremely large effect size among 
the 52 reported variants (AF = 0.0001, OR = 20.3). A covariate, X, is generated from the normal 
distribution, 𝑁(0,1). Then disease status is generated from a 1-0 Bernoulli distribution with 
probabilities 𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑖 = 1|𝑮𝒊, 𝑿𝒊) =
exp (𝛽0+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘 )
1+exp (𝛽0+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘 )
. Here, (𝛽1, 𝛽2, … , 𝛽51) are effect 
sizes referring to the same GWAS paper, and we set the effect size for covariate 𝑋, 𝛾, to be 1. 
The intercept, 𝛽0, which represents background disease prevalence, is set to be -2, -3 and -4. The 
exact marginal disease prevalence in the population based on AFs and background prevalence is 
not available. Because there are in total 351 possible combinations of genotypes for 51 variants, 
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𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑖 = 1) = ∑ 𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑖 = 1|𝐺𝑖) ∗ 𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑖)𝐺𝑖∈𝜅 , 
where 𝜅 is set of all combinations of genotypes. Therefore we calculate the empirical marginal 
disease prevalence by taking the mean of percentage of cases among 1000 simulated datasets. 
The marginal disease prevalence is ~4%, ~10% and ~15%, corresponding to background 
prevalence -4, -3 and -2 respectively.  
Once we have data without misclassification, we contaminate the phenotype with 
misclassification rate 1 − 𝛼0 in controls. More specifically, suppose there are 𝑛0 true controls in 
the sample, we randomly draw 𝑛0 phenotype from a 𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖(1 − 𝛼0) distribution to replace 
our original phenotype of those true control samples. We set 𝛼0 to be 0.85, 0.9, 0.95 and 1. 
As stated in the previous part, the known effect sizes should be used as external information 
when estimating parameters. The ideal situation is that we know the true effect sizes of the 
variants. In reality, we estimate the effect size from GWAS. To mimic the real situation, we 
generate another independent dataset of 1000 cases and 4000 controls using the same settings as 
above but without contamination in the phenotype. Then effect sizes are estimated based on this 
dataset without misclassification. We apply both true effect sizes and estimated effect sizes to 
our model as the external gold standard information. Finally, we compare the results of using 
estimated effect sizes with the results of using true effect sizes to demonstrate the magnitude of 
bias that the noise in the estimated effect sizes introduces. 
For each setting, we generate 1000 data sets and calculate the bias, variance and root-mean-
square error (RMSE) to evaluate the estimation accuracy of 𝛼0.  
As can be seen from Figure 2.1, in general we get an accurate estimation of 𝛼0 for different 







Figure 2.1(a,b): RMSE for estimation of specificity under different settings; (a) is using 
true effect sizes and (b) is using estimated effect sizes. The panel represents true specificity 




expected, increased sample size benefits the estimation accuracy. In addition, more accurate 
estimates occur in settings with lower disease prevalence. Moreover, in the comparison between 
applying true effect sizes and estimated effect sizes, we see higher RMSE in the latter settings. 
As Supplementary Table S2.1, the difference in bias explains a large proportion of the difference 
in RMSE. When applying estimated effect sizes in our likelihood, we introduce bias in the MLE 
of specificity and underestimate it. 
In addition to assess the performance of our method, we compare our method with the method 
used in Tsoi et al. in 2017. Their method has a similar idea of using external GWAS as a gold 
standard, which estimates the misclassification rate by examining the median difference of risk 
allele frequencies (RAFs) between EHR data with external cohorts (Tsoi et al., 2017). The 




However, they did not provide rigorous discussion and simulation for their method. We want to 
compare this method with our method through simulations. To make the comparison more 
comprehensive, for their method, we estimate 𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑖 = 1|𝑌𝑖 = 1) not only by examining the 
median difference, but also by examining the mean difference. Then 𝛼0̂ is calculated based on 
Bayes’ rule and compared with the estimation of our method. 
As shown in Figure 2.2, Supplementary Table S2.2 and S2.3, our method outperforms the other 
two methods in all settings. For example, in the setting with 10% disease prevalence, the RMSE 
of our method is 1.5 to 18 times smaller than the other two methods under the same setting. As 
shown in Supplementary Table S2.2(b) and S2.3(b), the difference in RMSE between methods 
can be explained mainly by the discrepancies between the biases of the estimates. Both the mean 
and median method underestimate the parameter and the bias is greater than that of our method 







Figure 2.2(a,b): RMSE for estimation of specificity based on different methods; (a) is using 
true effect sizes and (b) is using estimated effect sizes. Results shown here are for settings with 
disease prevalence 10%. The panel represents true specificity 𝛼0. The green line represents 
results using our method while red line and blue line represent method proposed by Tsoi et al. 




𝛼0 = 0.9, true effect sizes). 
2.3.2  The effect of the number of associated variants examined on estimation 
accuracy 
In real data analysis, it is not realistic to examine all variants that are associated with the disease. 
For example, the variant discovered by existing GWAS may not be genotyped or imputed in the 
EHR study. In addition, there is always some “missing heritability” that the existing GWAS do 
not have the power to uncover. In this section, we carry out the simulation to evaluate the 
performance of the proposed method when incorporating various amounts of information of the 
associated variants.  
As stated above, fifty one variants are associated with the disease. Then we assume the external 
gold standard GWAS only provide association information of limited amount of those variants. 
Information of 1, 25 and 51 variants is examined in the model to estimate 𝛼0. 
In settings using 1 variant, in order to check if incorporating information of variants with larger 
effect size will benefit our estimation, we estimate 𝛼0 using the variant with the largest effect 
size (effect size = 1.63) and compare the results of using a variant with moderate effect size 
(effect size = 0.17). In settings using 25 variants, the variants are randomly picked and fixed for 
every simulation. The remaining settings are kept the same as in Section 2.3.1. 
Again, for each setting, we generate 1000 data sets. Then we use bias, variance and RMSE to 
evaluate the estimation accuracy of 𝛼0. 
Supplementary Table S2.4 shows the RMSE of estimated specificity when using different 
number of variants. In general, using information from all the 51 variants provides estimates with 
lowest RMSE compared to other settings. As the number of variants used decreases, we are 
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likely to have estimates with larger variance and bias which result in larger RMSE. Figure 2.3 
shows the distribution of estimates when the sample size is 5000 with 10% disease prevalence 
and 0.9 specificity. Using one variant with the largest effect size (RMSE = 1.45E-04) has similar 
performance as using 25 variants (RMSE = 1.17E-04). Both outperform using one variant with a 
moderate effect size (RMSE = 4.84E-04). The RMSE for the latter one is over three times larger 
than using the one variant with the largest effect size. Later in Section 2.5, we will discuss how 
the number of variants examined impacts the estimation of specificity through a real data 
application.   
 
 
Figure 2.3: Distribution of estimated specificity by examining different number of variants. 
The table demonstrates the results under settings of 5000 samples, 0.9 specificity and 0.1 disease 
prevalence. The horizontal black line represents the true specificity, 0.9. 
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2.3.3 Distinguish "misclassified" samples due to the different liability thresholds 
from the truly misclassified ones 
It is possible that due to the different liability threshold used to dichotomize cases and controls in 
the EHR GWAS study and other GWAS studies, a sample classified as a control in one study can 
be classified as a case in another study (Supplementary Figure S2.1). Those samples are not truly 
misclassified, but can bias the association result together with the truly misclassified ones. In this 
section, we mimic this situation to test if our method can distinguish these two set of samples.    
According to the definition of the liability threshold model (Weissbrod et al., 2015), the liability 
of every individual i follows a normal distribution, 𝑙𝑖~𝑁(0,1). We generated the liability 
according to the model, 𝑙𝑖 = 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖, where 𝑔𝑖 and 𝑒𝑖 are the genetic and environmental 
components of the liability, respectively. Cases are individuals with 𝑙𝑖 > 𝑡, where 𝑡 is the 
liability cutoff, i.e. the threshold, for a particular trait of interest defined by disease prevalence. If 
disease prevalence is 𝐾, 𝑡 is given by Φ−1(1 − 𝐾), where Φ−1(∙) is the inverse cumulative 
probability density of the standard normal distribution.  
In these simulations, each individual carries 51 causal variants with similar AF as the previous 
simulation and normally distributed effect sizes. Setting heritability to be 0.25, we generate 
environmental components from a normal distribution 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑒
2), accordingly. Once the liability 
is obtained, case-control status is dichotomized by 𝑡 satisfying disease prevalence 𝐾. Here we 
assume disease prevalence 𝐾𝐸𝑋 is 10% for the external gold standard GWAS from which we 
derived the estimated effect sizes. We assume the disease prevalence for the EHR study, 𝐾𝐸𝐻𝑅, to 
be 5%, 10%, 15% and 20%. The discrepancies between 𝐾𝐸𝑋 and 𝐾𝐸𝐻𝑅 result in the first set of 
“misclassified” samples in the EHR. The second set of “misclassified” samples are generated by 
contaminating the phenotype using the same strategy as in the previous simulation with the 
22 
 
probability, 1-specificity. The specificity is set to be 0.85, 0.9, 0.95 and 1, and the sample size to 
1000 and 5000. In all experiments, 1000 data sets are generated for each unique combination of 
settings. We examine whether our model can distinguish the second set of misclassified samples 
from the first set of by evaluating the estimation of 𝛼0. Note that our method is constructed based 
on the logit model while data for this simulation is based on the liability threshold model. Thus, 
in addition to our main purpose, we can also demonstrate through this simulation whether our 
method is robust to model misspecification. 
In Supplementary Table S2.5, comparing results for settings with no threshold difference, we 
conclude that if the true underlying model is a liability threshold model, we underestimate the 
specificity using our method that is constructed based on a logit model. Our method is sensitive 
to model misspecification. 
If the liability threshold is lower in our EHR study than in the external GWAS where we borrow 
the information, the misclassification rate is overestimated and vice versa. This result implies 
that our model cannot distinguish the truly misclassified samples from those defined by a 
different dichotomizing liability threshold. The lower liability threshold in the EHR study results 
in more samples being classified as cases in EHR, our model treats those sets of samples as 
misclassified samples together with the truly misclassified ones, so that we overestimate the 
misclassification rate (Figure 2.4). When the external GWAS we use is assumed to have a 
different ascertainment than the EHR GWAS, the misclassification we estimate measures the 
total discrepancy in the phenotype between EHR and external GWAS. Thus, the interpretation of 
the estimated misclassification rate should change from “misclassification” to “misclassification 






Figure 2.4: Distribution of estimated specificity when there is a liability threshold 
difference between EHR and external GWAS. The table shows the results under settings of 
5000 samples and 0.85 specificity. The horizontal black line represents the true specificity, 0.85. 
 
2.3.4 Type I error and power 
In this section, we conduct extensive simulation studies to evaluate the performance of the 
likelihood ratio test. Data are generated the same way as in Section 2.3.1. Then we evaluate type 
I error in settings having 𝛼0 equals 1 and power in other settings at significance level 𝛼 = 0.01 
and 0.05.  
The empirical type I error is shown in Table 2.1. At both 0.05 and 0.01 significance level, we can 
control the type I error well in all the 24 settings when applying the true effect sizes. However, 
we do suffer from the inconsistency of the estimator, when using estimated effect sizes. The type 
I error is inflated by 2 to 3 fold in those settings. To be more specific, we get more inflated 
results in settings with larger sample sizes, because the bias between true effect sizes and 
estimated effect sizes is amplified.  
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Table 2.1: Empirical type I error for likelihood ratio test testing null hypothesis. The null 
hypothesis refers to no misclassification in controls. 
    alpha=0.05 alpha=0.01 
 
                 Size 
prevalence  




4% 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
10% 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
15% 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Estimate 
effect size 
4% 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.17 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
10% 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.24 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
15% 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.32 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 
 
Here the external information of effect sizes is based on a cohort of only 5000 samples. In the 
real up-to-date GWAS, we could expect to get external estimated effect sizes based on a larger 
cohort. Thus we conduct a simulation using odds ratios calculated based on 20,000 samples. The 
type I error is shown in Supplementary Table S2.6. When estimated based on more samples, the 
external gold-standard effect sizes is closer to the truth. As a consequence, the type I error rate is 
better controlled. This simulation suggests that we should consider using effect sizes from larger 
studies that has better approximation to the true effect sizes generally to guarantee the control of 
type I error rate.   
The power of the test is greater than 70% in most settings. Settings using the true or the 
estimated effect sizes perform similarly well, while settings with higher disease prevalence show 
a slight loss in power compared to settings with lower disease prevalence due to the less accurate 
estimation of specificity in the settings with high disease prevalence (Figure 2.5). 
The results of power in the remaining set of simulations for all 48 simulation configurations are 









Figure 2.5 (a,b): Power for likelihood ratio test under settings with specificity = 0.9 at 0.01 
significance level; (a) is using true effect sizes and (b) is using estimated effect sizes. The red, 
blue and green line represent 15%, 10% and 4% disease prevalence respectively. 
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Based on results from Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.4, we conclude that noise in the estimated effect 
sizes does affect our estimation accuracy and the inference. That’s why we emphasize the 
importance of study and risk variant selection in Section 2.2. 
2.4 Application on MGI data 
2.4.1 MGI data set 
The Michigan Genomics Initiative is a collaborative study of the University of Michigan (UM) 
aiming to combine patient EHR with genetic information in order to gain novel biomedical 
insights.  
Patients undergoing surgery at the UM Health System are invited to participate. Patients' 
biospecimens and their health information are collected during the surgical procedural period. 
Consenting patients are genotyped at 270K common variants on a customized Illumina Infinium 
HumanCoreExome-24 v1.0 array (Illumina, 2017). Then genotypes are imputed using the 
Haplotype Reference Consortium reference panel (Haplotype Reference Consortium, 2016). 
Meanwhile, phenotypes are constructed from ICD-9-CM billing based on a scheme implemented 
in the PheWAS R package. In total, there are 1,448 PheWAS codes with at least 20 cases for 
18,267 unrelated European ancestry individuals that can be used for genome-wide association 
analysis in the Phase I MGI study. For more information on MGI, see 
https://precisionhealth.umich.edu/michigangenomics/. 
The enriched information provides us a chance to accelerate the pace of genomic discovery. 
However, for some traits like type II diabetes, the attenuated effect sizes from previous MGI 
GWAS compared to effect sizes from other large-scale GWAS indicate potential 




2.4.2 Estimation of misclassification rate in four phenotypes 
To verify the existence of misclassification in MGI data and quantify it, we estimate the 
misclassification rate by fitting the model specified in the previous section for several traits. 
These traits showing evidence of misclassification in previous MGI GWAS include AMD, type 
II diabetes and psoriasis (Supplementary Figure S2.2(a-c)). We also apply our method to breast 
cancer which has not shown clear evidence of misclassification (Supplementary Figure S2.2(d)). 
As described above, to fit the model, one critical step is to get gold standard information from 
external large GWAS results. Fifty-two independent variants have been previously reported to be 
associated with AMD by the International AMD Genomics Consortium (Fritsche et al., 2016). 
For our estimation, we use 44 variants that were available and passed filters (MAF>0.0001 and 
Rsq>0.3) in MGI data. For breast cancer, we incorporate results of five large-scale GWAS that 
reported 73 independent variants (Turnbull et al., 2010; Fletcher et al., 2011; Michailidou et al., 
2013; Michailidou et al., 2015; Michailidou et al., 2017). For psoriasis, we combine results from 
five large-scale GWAS that reported 41 significant independent variants (Strange et al., 2010; 
Stuart et al., 2010; Tsoi et al., 2012; Tsoi et al., 2015; Yin et al., 2015). For T2D, we use 77 
independent variants based on seven large-scale GWAS (Zeggini et al., 2008; Voight et al., 2010; 
Morris et al., 2012; Saxena et al., 2012; Consortium, Diabetes SAT2D, et al., 2014; Gaulton et 
al., 2015; Scott et al., 2017). Since some traits like AMD are highly correlated with age, we 
adjust for age in our model. The first four PCs are also adjusted in our model. 
Once we estimate specificity, 𝛼0̂, we calculate the posterior misclassification rate, the 
misclassification rate in observed cases, based on the following Bayes' rule: 






Here the marginal probability of observed cases 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖 = 1) is estimated by the moment 
estimator. 𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑖 = 1) is estimated by the moment estimator derived based on 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖 = 1) =
𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑖 = 1) + (1 − 𝛼0) ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝑟 (𝐷𝑖 = 1)). 
The estimated misclassification rate in true controls is 0.3%, 1.5%, 0.8%  and 4.8% for AMD, 
breast cancer, psoriasis and T2D resulting in 39.5%, 9.0%, 56.5% and 37.8% misclassified 
samples, respectively, in the observed cases (Table 2.2). The Bonferroni-corrected significance 
threshold is derived as p-value < 0.05/4 = 0.0125 to account for examination of the four traits. 
The results for AMD, T2D and psoriasis are significant (p-valueAMD = 2.10E-10; p-valueT2D = 
4.70E-15; p-valuepsoriasis = 5.63E-15) while the result for breast cancer is not significant (p-
valuebreast cancer = 6.71E-2). This results shows concordance with the effect sizes comparison with 
the external GWAS (Supplementary Figure S2.2(a-d)). We also estimate the specificity by 
examining half of the most significant variants as well as one variant with largest effect size 
(Table 2.4). The impact of variants selection on the estimation and the source of misclassification 
of these diseases will be discussed in Section 2.5.     
Table 2.2: Estimated misclassification rate in 4 traits. 
  Cases Controls Estimated (1-𝜶𝟎) P-value 
Misclassification 
rate in observed 
cases 
AMD 119 16516 0.3% 2.10E-10 39.5% 
Breast cancer 1136 6884 1.5% 6.71E-2 9.0% 
Psoriasis 231 15612 0.8% 5.63E-15 56.5% 
T2D 1974 14848 4.8% 4.70E-15 37.8% 
 
2.4.3 Comparison of different case definition schemes for AMD 
Patients' clinical information is gathered during every hospital visit. Therefore, we usually have 
more than one encounter of each phenotype for the sample. On average, samples had about 20 to 
30 encounters for one trait.  
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The longitudinal feature of the data raises the question of the best way to define a case. In the 
previous MGI GWAS, we defined a case if one had more than 2 encounters. However, this may 
not be the best case definition scheme. Usually, patients with a larger number of encounters are 
more likely to be a true case. So in this section, taking AMD as an example, we try to estimate 
the misclassification rate for different case-definition schemes and to find the best encounter 
cutoff to define a case.  
Table 2.3 and Supplementary Table S2.8 show the estimated misclassification rate in observed 
AMD cases when using 1 to 13 as encounter cutoff to define a case. Here, to guarantee the 
reliability of the estimation, we only examine the encounter cutoffs that define more than 30 
cases. As the cutoff becomes more stringent, we get cohorts of fewer cases with a lower 
misclassification rate. Based on the Holm’s sequential Bonferroni method (1979), we define the 
significance threshold for the sequential tests. The misclassification in the phenotype is not 
significant with encounter cutoff greater than 7 (Supplementary Table S2.8). Multiplying 
observed cases with the 1-misclassification rate, we have the expected number of correctly 
classified cases, which shows how much we gain when using more stringent cutoffs. For 
example, if releasing the criterion from 3 to 2 we get 33 new cases, of which only 13 are 
correctly specified. If we release the criterion from 4 to 3, we get 12 more cases that half of them 
are correctly specified. As the encounter cutoff becomes more stringent, the proportion of 
correctly classified samples in the newly defined samples increases.  
Using the phenotype with less misclassification for GWAS, we expect to get the estimation of 
the effect size with smaller bias. Here we examine the top two common variants with the largest 
effect sizes, rs3750846 around gene ARMS2 and rs10922109 around gene CFH, to check if their 
results are converge to the external GWAS when we use refined phenotype (Fritsche et al., 2016). 
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In terms of the minor allele frequency (MAF) in the cases and the estimated effect size, MGI 
results converge to the external gold-standard as we increase encounter cutoffs (Supplementary 
Table S2.9), which is concordant with the decreasing misclassification rate in the phenotype.  
The results imply that as we use a higher cutoff of encounters to define a case, we have a more 
reliable set of cases. A caveat is that the number of cases also decreases as we refine the 
phenotype, which results in the unbalanced case-control ratios invalidating asymptotic 
assumptions of the logistic regression. Thus using phenotype with small case count, even though 
it is refined, we are not able to achieve the convergence of the effect sizes to the external AMD 
GWAS for the variants having low AFs (Supplementary Figure S2.3). In Section S 2.5, we will 
discuss several possible solutions of how to increase the power of GWAS with refined phenotype 
that has small number of cases and how to correct the effect size estimation directly with the 
misclassification rate that our method provides.  
Table 2.3: Estimated misclassification rate in observed cases when using different 
encounter cutoffs to define an AMD case. 










≥1 encounter 144 16516 0.40% 47.40% 76 
≥2 encounters 119 16516 0.30% 39.50% 71 
≥3 encounters 86 16516 0.16% 32.30% 58 
≥4 encounters 74 16516 0.12% 28.50% 53 
≥5 encounters 65 16516 0.10% 26.62% 48 
≥6 encounters 55 16516 0.10% 29.49% 39 
≥7 encounters 49 16516 0.06% 20.26% 39 
≥8 encounters 45 16516 0.04% 14.92% 38 
≥9 encounters 44 16516 0.04% 15.50% 37 
≥10 encounters 42 16516 0.04% 16.40% 35 
≥11 encounters 38 16516 0.02% 9.50% 34 
≥12 encounters 37 16516 0.02% 10.60% 33 





In this chapter, we have developed a method for estimating the misclassification rate of disease 
status using genotype information. The method can provide estimates with high accuracy and has 
the advantage of simplicity that avoids identifying gold standard samples.  
In the comparison with the method proposed by Tsoi et al (2017), our method demonstrates 
higher accuracy in the estimation of specificity. The outperformance of our method is more 
apparent in practice. Our method requires external information of odds ratios or effect sizes 
while Tsoi’s method requires RAFs in cases/controls. However, the background disease 
prevalence is unknown so the exact RAFS cannot be calculated. Instead, they are approximated 
based on odds ratios and population AFs. As our simulation shows, using approximated RAFs 
lead to an even less accurate estimation than using exact RAFs (Supplementary Table S2.4). In 
contrast, odds ratios are generally reported, and thus our method has an obvious advantage 
regarding estimation accuracy when exact RAFs are not available in the real data analysis.     
Our method is easy to apply and useful, although potential failures of the assumptions involved 
should be borne in mind. First, our model is based on the assumption that the effect sizes in the 
EHR GWAS are very similar to those in the external GWAS. As demonstrated in the simulation, 
we get a good estimate when the gold-standard effect sizes we borrow are not far from the true 
effect sizes. Thus, it is necessary to carefully consider the plausibility of this assumption in the 
context of the individual study, especially for a phenotype that is highly correlated with 
demographic factors. For example, AMD is highly correlated with age, and the distribution of 
age in the external GWAS cohorts may be different from the EHR cohort, which may lead to 
different disease-genetic associations. Even though we allow the control for demographic 
covariates in our model, the non-linear relationship between the disease onset and age may still 
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bias the estimation of the specificity when we ignore the cohorts’ demographic discrepancy. To 
avoid this problem, we should always select external GWAS that have similar cohorts as the 
EHR cohort to be the gold standard. Second, we should be careful when selecting the associated 
variants. In our analysis of MGI data, we only borrowed information from reliable large-scale 
GWAS with more than 10k samples. One may consider using a large database like the GWAS 
catalog from which to draw information. However, in this database, results are not well 
harmonized in that GWAS of different phenotypes may be combined into one trait. Therefore we 
suggest using them with a cautious screening of the variants.  
Within these variant inclusion restrictions, the simulation result in Section 2.3.2 suggests that we 
should consider using as many associated variants that pass the filter as possible; and variants 
with larger effect sizes should have higher priority to be included. To examine the consistency of 
the estimated specificity with different number of variants incorporated into the model, we can 
conduct a sensitivity analysis in MGI. When one of the associated variants has an effect size that 
is significantly larger than the others, like AMD, the estimation is consistent, since the effect of 
the other variants may be masked by that variant. When all the associated variants have moderate 
effect sizes, the results are concordant with the conclusion of the previous simulation analysis 
that the specificity will be slightly overestimated when the information of some of the reliable 
associated variants is not examined (Table 2.4). Thus, our method demonstrates the utility for 
diseases whose association with genetic variation has been investigated through large-scale 
GWAS. However, our method is not applicable for diseases that do not have well-established 
GWAS. For those diseases, we may consider first selecting potential associated variants based on 
EHR GWAS, and then using the EM algorithm proposed by Magder and Hughes (1997) to 
estimate the misclassification rate without incorporating external effect sizes.   
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Table 2.4: Estimated specificity in 4 traits by examining different number of variants. 
Specificity is estimated using all associated variants, half of the variants with the largest effect 
sizes and the variant with the largest effect size.  
  All variants Half variants One variant 
AMD 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
Breast cancer 1.5% 1.7% 2.0% 
Psoriasis 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 
T2D 4.8% 4.9% 4.9% 
 
In addition to carefully selecting the variant list, the uncertainty in the estimation of external 
gold-standard effect sizes should be considered. Usually, the effect sizes are reported in multiple 
GWAS that have different sample sizes. We take the average of the effect sizes in multiple 
external GWAS and fix it in our model. In future work, to better address the uncertainty in the 
estimation of effect sizes, we can take the weighted average of effect sizes, by weighting each 
GWAS result based on their sample sizes. In addition, instead of fixing external effect sizes in 
our model, we can estimate these effect sizes together with the specificity and constrain the 
estimation within the confidence intervals in the external gold-standard GWAS. 
Moreover, once we estimate the misclassification rate by examining a reliable set of variants, it 
can be used as a quality metric for refining the phenotype. Typically, the effect size estimation in 
EHR GWAS with the refined phenotype is expected to converge to that in the external gold-
standard GWAS. However, the reduced number of cases and the unbalanced case/control ratios 
of the refined phenotype cause a wider range of uncertainty in the effect size estimation. As a 
consequence, we may not necessarily see the convergence of the refined EHR GWAS to the 
external GWAS, especially for variants with low AF. In order to retain the power of uncovering 
disease-genetic associations, instead of using the traditional logistic regression, we can conduct 
association tests that account for unbalanced case/control ratio in the phenotype (Zhou et al., 
2018). In addition, rather than refining the phenotype, we may consider correcting estimated 
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effect sizes directly with the estimated misclassification rate using the formulas derived by 
Neuhaus (1999) or Duffy (2004), or using the iteratively reweighted least square algorithm 
(Magder and Hughes, 1997). Figure 2.6 shows the estimated effect sizes of the two top 
associated variants, rs3750846 and rs10922109, using different methods. Either using refined 
phenotype (≥ 7 encounters) or correcting effect sizes directly with Duffy’s method provides us 
with results that are closer to the external GWAS than those estimated from a misclassified 
cohort (≥ 2 encounters). 
 
Figure 2.6 Estimated effect sizes in external GWAS and EHR GWAS with refined 
phenotype or with Duffy’s correction. Here two top associated variants, rs3750846 (ARMS2) 
and rs10922109 (CFH), are examined (Fritsche et al., 2016). The red targets represent their effect 
sizes in external GWAS. The blue dots represent estimation using misclassified samples that are 
defined by encounter cutoff = 2. The green dots represent estimation using misclassified samples 
that are defined by encounter cutoff = 7, which have no significant misclassification. The purple 
dots represent effect sizes corrected from the blue dots using Duffy’s method. 
In the application of four traits in MGI data, significant misclassification was detected in AMD, 
psoriasis and T2D while no significant misclassification was detected in breast cancer. The 
misclassification can occur either during the translation from ICD codes to the dichotomized 
phenotypes or during the assignment of ICD codes to patients. First, the ICD codes are typically 
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not surrogates for binary phenotypes; in other words, multiple ICD codes may describe the same 
diagnosis. Thus, the complexity in the translation from ICD codes to phenotypes may lead to the 
potential misclassification. For example, for T2D, we combine 10 different ICD codes having 
“type II diabetes mellitus” in their description into one phenotype. However, some of these ICD 
codes may refer to types of T2D that should be analyzed separately, like “250.10 - Diabetes with 
ketoacidosis” and “250.20 - Diabetes with hyperosmolarity.” In addition, the descriptions of 
some ICD codes are ambiguous. For example, the ICD code 696 for psoriasis has the description, 
“psoriasis and similar disorders,” which may classify patients with diseases other than psoriasis 
as a case. For AMD, the ICD codes do not indicate the stage of the disease, so that patients at 
early or moderate stage of  AMD may be classified as a case in EHR while the external GWAS 
are typically conducted on advanced AMD. Moreover, as discussed by O’Malley et al. (2005), 
errors in ICD code can occur in every step of them being assigned to patients, including the 
communication between patients and clinicians, the clinicians’ knowledge of the disease as well 
as intentional code errors, like upcoding. Upcoding, here, means that codes of higher 
reimbursement value may be assigned due to some reimbursement purpose. It misrepresents the 
true condition of the patient, which may cause controls being misclassified as cases. O’Malley et 
al. also assert that a disease for which tests have high sensitivity will have higher diagnostic 
accuracy and smaller error in the ICD codes. This is why breast cancer typically has higher 
diagnostic accuracy and does not show significant misclassification in the MGI data.  
Ultimately, by using our method we are able to detect misclassification between cases and 
controls and correct biased association analysis in EHR GWAS. However, there are still other 
types of misclassification that limit the usage of EHR. For example, despite the fact that T1D and 
T2D arise from different etiologies, it is hard to distinguish these two diseases based on ICD-9-
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CM codes (Kho et al., 2011; Richesson et al., 2013). Since both diseases are characterized by 
high blood glucose level and share similar treatment, only considering additional information of 
diagnostic lab tests and treatment is not adequate to distinguish them. It should be more useful to 
incorporate genotype information given that these two diseases have different associated variants. 
Future development of methods dealing with misclassification between cases like T1D and T2D 
using genotype information will bring about more powerful genetic discovery research using 
EHR data. 
In conclusion, we have proposed a method that enables the evaluation of new EHR-based case 
definition schemes and the correction of estimates of disease effect sizes and other association 
measures when phenotypes are misclassified. This method has limitations that need further 
investigation, including the inefficient process of risk variants selection and the disregarding of 
the misclassification between different phenotypes. Nevertheless, the method can reduce the bias 
in the search of disease-genetic associations and enhances the power of uncovering novel and 
reliable genomic basis of human diseases. 











Supplementary note: Estimating the variance of the parameter estimates when true 
specificity is not on the boundary. 
 
When the model is correctly specified and the true parameter is not on the boundary, the 
variance/covariance matrix of the parameter estimates can be approximated by the inverse of the 
observed information matrix. This matrix is the negative of the second derivative of the log 
likelihood function evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimates.  
Recall the log-likelihood has this form , 
𝑙(𝒀, 𝑮, 𝑿; 𝛼0, 𝛼1, 𝜷, 𝜸) 
∝ ∑ 𝑌𝑖 log (
𝑒𝛽0+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘
1 + 𝑒𝛽0+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘
+
1 − 𝛼0
1 + 𝑒𝛽0+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘
)
𝑖
+ (1 − 𝑌𝑖) log (
𝛼0
1 + 𝑒𝛽0+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘
) 
Here, we assume (𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝐽) are known parameters indicating effect sizes of the kwon diseased 
associated variants. Then the parameters we estimate are 𝜃 = (𝛼0, 𝛽0, 𝛾1, … , 𝛾𝐾). To simplify the 
notation, we use 𝛾0to represent 𝛽0 and 𝑋𝑖0 = (1, … ,1). So that 𝜃 becomes (𝛼0, 𝛾0, 𝛾1, … , 𝛾𝐾). 

















𝛾0+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘








𝛾0+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘
(𝑒𝛾0+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 1 − 𝛼0)2
− ∑
𝑋𝑖𝑚𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑒
𝛾0+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘
























𝐵 = −𝑋𝑇𝐻, where 𝐻𝑖 =
𝑌𝑖𝑒
𝛾0̂+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾?̂?𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘
(𝑒
𝛾0̂+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾?̂?𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘 +1−𝛼0̂)2
; 
𝐶 = 𝑋𝑇𝑉1𝑋 − 𝑋
𝑇𝑉2𝑋, where 𝑉1 is a diagonal matrix with diagonal element 
𝑣1𝑖 =
𝑒
𝛾0̂+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾?̂?𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘
(𝑒
𝛾0̂+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾?̂?𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘 +1)
2 and 𝑉2 is a diagonal matrix with diagonal element 𝑣2𝑖 =
(1−𝛼0̂)𝑌𝑖𝑒
𝛾0̂+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾?̂?𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘
(𝑒
𝛾0̂+∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗 +∑ 𝛾?̂?𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘 +1−𝛼0̂)2
. 
Thus when the true specificity 𝛼0 is not 0 or 1 and the effect sizes of known disease associated 
variants are correctly specified, the variance/covariance matrix of the estimates can be 







Supplementary Table S2.1 (a,b): (a) MSE and (b) bias for estimation of specificity under different settings. 
(a) 
    Prevalence=4% Prevalence=10% Prevalence=15% 




300 9.42E-04 7.05E-04 4.22E-04 4.56E-05 1.30E-03 9.62E-04 6.84E-04 9.24E-05 2.12E-03 1.83E-03 1.00E-03 2.51E-04 
500 5.61E-04 3.77E-04 2.45E-04 1.86E-05 7.45E-04 5.85E-04 3.78E-04 5.08E-05 1.17E-03 1.03E-03 6.65E-04 1.21E-04 
1000 2.47E-04 1.95E-04 1.14E-04 8.52E-06 3.62E-04 2.87E-04 1.86E-04 2.36E-05 5.89E-04 4.90E-04 3.40E-04 5.95E-05 




300 8.74E-04 6.58E-04 4.18E-04 6.17E-05 1.35E-03 8.91E-04 6.76E-04 1.49E-04 1.93E-03 1.65E-03 9.87E-04 4.15E-04 
500 5.15E-04 3.88E-04 2.58E-04 3.24E-05 7.61E-04 5.67E-04 3.63E-04 9.59E-05 1.11E-03 1.06E-03 6.94E-04 2.50E-04 
1000 2.62E-04 2.00E-04 1.33E-04 1.74E-05 3.81E-04 3.06E-04 2.01E-04 5.10E-05 6.19E-04 5.57E-04 4.22E-04 1.55E-04 
5000 6.38E-05 4.57E-05 3.16E-05 4.66E-06 9.95E-05 8.24E-05 6.06E-05 1.68E-05 2.05E-04 1.70E-04 1.43E-04 6.07E-05 
(b) 
    Prevalence=4% Prevalence=10% Prevalence=15% 




300 4.2E-03 2.4E-03 1.5E-03 -3.1E-03 2.6E-03 2.1E-03 8.7E-04 -4.6E-03 2.8E-03 1.7E-03 3.8E-04 -7.7E-03 
500 1.7E-03 6.9E-04 1.8E-03 -2.0E-03 2.6E-03 1.9E-03 4.2E-04 -3.6E-03 1.6E-03 9.2E-04 6.5E-04 -5.5E-03 
1000 7.6E-04 7.6E-04 5.9E-04 -1.4E-03 1.4E-03 3.5E-04 1.5E-03 -2.3E-03 -3.1E-04 1.0E-03 1.3E-03 -4.0E-03 




300 -1.6E-03 -6.1E-04 -1.3E-03 -3.9E-03 5.5E-04 -5.3E-03 -2.7E-03 -6.6E-03 -6.6E-03 -7.6E-03 -6.4E-03 -1.2E-02 
500 -1.1E-03 -1.0E-03 -1.1E-03 -3.0E-03 -3.7E-03 -3.9E-03 -3.5E-03 -5.4E-03 -6.8E-03 -8.5E-03 -7.1E-03 -9.4E-03 
1000 -2.3E-03 -2.3E-03 -2.1E-03 -2.3E-03 -4.1E-03 -4.9E-03 -4.3E-03 -4.4E-03 -7.9E-03 -9.3E-03 -8.5E-03 -8.2E-03 







Supplementary Table S2.2 (a,b): (a) MSE and (b) bias for estimation of specificity from the method proposed by Tsoi et al. by 
examining the mean RAFs difference. 
(a) 
    Prevalence=4% Prevalence=10% Prevalence=15% 




300 1.79E-03 1.64E-03 1.20E-03 6.49E-04 3.15E-03 3.23E-03 2.67E-03 2.22E-03 8.47E-03 8.76E-03 8.78E-03 9.03E-03 
500 1.24E-03 1.03E-03 7.99E-04 4.55E-04 2.51E-03 2.30E-03 2.26E-03 1.88E-03 7.25E-03 8.01E-03 7.93E-03 8.03E-03 
1000 7.73E-04 5.88E-04 4.40E-04 2.86E-04 1.86E-03 1.72E-03 1.64E-03 1.48E-03 6.54E-03 6.79E-03 7.42E-03 7.61E-03 




300 2.68E-03 2.37E-03 1.69E-03 1.03E-03 4.23E-03 3.75E-03 3.31E-03 2.57E-03 8.57E-03 9.48E-03 9.02E-03 9.06E-03 
500 1.59E-03 1.42E-03 1.08E-03 5.96E-04 2.85E-03 2.86E-03 2.20E-03 1.76E-03 6.39E-03 6.90E-03 7.78E-03 6.82E-03 
1000 9.38E-04 7.49E-04 5.81E-04 3.09E-04 1.88E-03 1.72E-03 1.53E-03 1.24E-03 5.66E-03 5.63E-03 6.20E-03 6.05E-03 
5000 2.63E-04 2.28E-04 1.73E-04 1.09E-04 1.08E-03 1.08E-03 9.64E-04 8.74E-04 4.73E-03 5.09E-03 5.15E-03 5.29E-03 
(b) 
    Prevalence=4% Prevalence=10% Prevalence=15% 




300 -1.4E-02 -1.2E-02 -1.0E-02 -1.1E-02 -3.1E-02 -3.4E-02 -3.2E-02 -3.2E-02 -7.2E-02 -7.6E-02 -7.8E-02 -8.1E-02 
500 -1.4E-02 -1.2E-02 -1.2E-02 -1.1E-02 -3.4E-02 -3.4E-02 -3.5E-02 -3.3E-02 -7.4E-02 -7.9E-02 -8.0E-02 -8.1E-02 
1000 -1.3E-02 -1.1E-02 -1.2E-02 -1.1E-02 -3.5E-02 -3.4E-02 -3.4E-02 -3.4E-02 -7.5E-02 -7.7E-02 -8.2E-02 -8.3E-02 




300 -8.1E-03 -9.0E-03 -6.6E-03 -6.8E-03 -2.9E-02 -2.8E-02 -2.4E-02 -2.4E-02 -6.0E-02 -6.7E-02 -6.6E-02 -6.9E-02 
500 -9.4E-03 -8.6E-03 -6.4E-03 -6.1E-03 -2.7E-02 -3.0E-02 -2.7E-02 -2.6E-02 -6.0E-02 -6.5E-02 -7.1E-02 -6.5E-02 
1000 -8.6E-03 -9.6E-03 -7.8E-03 -6.6E-03 -3.0E-02 -2.9E-02 -2.7E-02 -2.5E-02 -6.5E-02 -6.5E-02 -6.9E-02 -6.9E-02 






Supplementary Table S2.3 (a,b): (a) MSE and (b) bias for estimation of specificity from the method proposed by Tsoi et al. by 
examining the median RAFs difference. 
(a) 
    Prevalence=4% Prevalence=10% Prevalence=15% 




300 1.87E-03 1.67E-03 1.24E-03 6.07E-04 3.31E-03 3.44E-03 3.01E-03 2.12E-03 8.85E-03 9.00E-03 9.33E-03 9.57E-03 
500 1.16E-03 9.86E-04 8.52E-04 4.13E-04 2.49E-03 2.37E-03 2.32E-03 1.89E-03 7.28E-03 8.16E-03 7.60E-03 8.13E-03 
1000 7.18E-04 5.72E-04 4.56E-04 2.85E-04 1.86E-03 1.71E-03 1.58E-03 1.51E-03 6.54E-03 6.92E-03 7.14E-03 7.25E-03 




300 8.85E-03 9.00E-03 9.33E-03 9.57E-03 1.77E-03 1.55E-03 1.09E-03 8.23E-04 3.55E-03 3.74E-03 3.02E-03 2.56E-03 
500 7.28E-03 8.16E-03 7.60E-03 8.13E-03 1.07E-03 1.10E-03 8.38E-04 4.46E-04 2.70E-03 2.73E-03 2.46E-03 2.21E-03 
1000 6.54E-03 6.92E-03 7.14E-03 7.25E-03 6.68E-04 6.17E-04 5.18E-04 3.30E-04 2.14E-03 2.11E-03 1.97E-03 1.81E-03 
5000 5.88E-03 6.10E-03 6.53E-03 6.86E-03 3.35E-04 2.99E-04 2.70E-04 2.25E-04 1.62E-03 1.67E-03 1.65E-03 1.64E-03 
 
(b) 
    Prevalence=4% Prevalence=10% Prevalence=15% 




300 -1.8E-02 -1.6E-02 -1.2E-02 -1.1E-02 -3.7E-02 -3.9E-02 -3.8E-02 -3.1E-02 -7.8E-02 -8.1E-02 -8.4E-02 -8.5E-02 
500 -1.6E-02 -1.5E-02 -1.5E-02 -1.0E-02 -3.6E-02 -3.7E-02 -3.7E-02 -3.4E-02 -7.5E-02 -8.1E-02 -7.9E-02 -8.2E-02 
1000 -1.5E-02 -1.2E-02 -1.4E-02 -1.1E-02 -3.6E-02 -3.5E-02 -3.4E-02 -3.5E-02 -7.6E-02 -7.8E-02 -8.1E-02 -8.2E-02 




300 -1.9E-02 -1.8E-02 -1.5E-02 -1.7E-02 -4.2E-02 -4.5E-02 -4.1E-02 -3.9E-02 -8.4E-02 -8.8E-02 -9.2E-02 -9.2E-02 
500 -1.7E-02 -1.8E-02 -1.6E-02 -1.4E-02 -4.0E-02 -4.3E-02 -4.2E-02 -4.1E-02 -7.9E-02 -8.4E-02 -8.9E-02 -9.1E-02 
1000 -1.5E-02 -1.6E-02 -1.6E-02 -1.4E-02 -4.0E-02 -4.0E-02 -3.9E-02 -3.9E-02 -8.0E-02 -8.3E-02 -8.6E-02 -8.8E-02 






Supplementary Table S2.4 (a-d): MSE of estimated specificity when using different number of variants. (a) 51 variants, (b) 25 
variants, (c) 1 variant with the largest effect size (d)1 variant with moderate effect size 
 
(a) 
    Prevalence=4% Prevalence=10% Prevalence=15% 




300 9.42E-04 7.05E-04 4.22E-04 4.56E-05 1.30E-03 9.62E-04 6.84E-04 9.24E-05 2.12E-03 1.83E-03 1.00E-03 2.51E-04 
500 5.61E-04 3.77E-04 2.45E-04 1.86E-05 7.45E-04 5.85E-04 3.78E-04 5.08E-05 1.17E-03 1.03E-03 6.65E-04 1.21E-04 
1000 2.47E-04 1.95E-04 1.14E-04 8.52E-06 3.62E-04 2.87E-04 1.86E-04 2.36E-05 5.89E-04 4.90E-04 3.40E-04 5.95E-05 




300 8.74E-04 6.58E-04 4.18E-04 6.17E-05 1.35E-03 8.91E-04 6.76E-04 1.49E-04 1.93E-03 1.65E-03 9.87E-04 4.15E-04 
500 5.15E-04 3.88E-04 2.58E-04 3.24E-05 7.61E-04 5.67E-04 3.63E-04 9.59E-05 1.11E-03 1.06E-03 6.94E-04 2.50E-04 
1000 2.62E-04 2.00E-04 1.33E-04 1.74E-05 3.81E-04 3.06E-04 2.01E-04 5.10E-05 6.19E-04 5.57E-04 4.22E-04 1.55E-04 
5000 6.38E-05 4.57E-05 3.16E-05 4.66E-06 9.95E-05 8.24E-05 6.06E-05 1.68E-05 2.05E-04 1.70E-04 1.43E-04 6.07E-05 
 
(b) 
    Prevalence=4% Prevalence=10% Prevalence=15% 




300 1.27E-03 9.99E-04 6.30E-04 1.08E-04 2.06E-03 1.49E-03 1.08E-03 2.85E-04 3.23E-03 2.89E-03 1.85E-03 8.25E-04 
500 7.81E-04 5.85E-04 3.89E-04 5.29E-05 1.15E-03 8.61E-04 5.87E-04 1.67E-04 2.00E-03 1.66E-03 1.21E-03 5.10E-04 
1000 3.65E-04 2.77E-04 1.82E-04 2.36E-05 5.43E-04 4.75E-04 3.09E-04 7.94E-05 9.91E-04 9.23E-04 6.49E-04 3.22E-04 




300 1.22E-03 9.34E-04 6.46E-04 1.17E-04 1.96E-03 1.52E-03 1.06E-03 3.28E-04 2.99E-03 2.87E-03 1.85E-03 1.29E-03 
500 7.19E-04 5.91E-04 3.75E-04 7.10E-05 1.13E-03 9.29E-04 5.92E-04 2.31E-04 2.00E-03 1.87E-03 1.38E-03 7.27E-04 
1000 3.61E-04 3.14E-04 1.91E-04 3.90E-05 5.76E-04 5.13E-04 3.77E-04 1.40E-04 1.26E-03 1.15E-03 9.94E-04 5.35E-04 






    Prevalence=4% Prevalence=10% Prevalence=15% 




300 1.43E-03 1.21E-03 7.08E-04 1.23E-04 2.38E-03 1.89E-03 1.26E-03 3.81E-04 4.49E-03 3.40E-03 2.28E-03 1.28E-03 
500 8.44E-04 6.91E-04 4.44E-04 7.42E-05 1.29E-03 1.07E-03 7.72E-04 2.31E-04 2.55E-03 2.16E-03 1.64E-03 9.12E-04 
1000 3.90E-04 3.23E-04 2.21E-04 3.68E-05 7.11E-04 5.33E-04 3.99E-04 1.41E-04 1.48E-03 1.23E-03 9.66E-04 5.35E-04 




300 1.37E-03 1.09E-03 6.99E-04 1.39E-04 2.17E-03 1.72E-03 1.20E-03 4.44E-04 3.90E-03 3.58E-03 2.37E-03 1.38E-03 
500 8.05E-04 6.48E-04 4.80E-04 1.00E-04 1.26E-03 1.05E-03 7.55E-04 2.40E-04 2.53E-03 2.29E-03 1.74E-03 9.97E-04 
1000 3.83E-04 3.35E-04 2.30E-04 3.82E-05 6.73E-04 5.82E-04 4.00E-04 1.62E-04 1.42E-03 1.42E-03 1.11E-03 6.49E-04 
5000 9.91E-05 7.59E-05 5.37E-05 1.12E-05 2.04E-04 1.78E-04 1.41E-04 5.93E-05 6.45E-04 5.99E-04 5.15E-04 3.44E-04 
(d) 
    Prevalence=4% Prevalence=10% Prevalence=15% 




300 6.43E-03 3.66E-03 1.35E-03 1.63E-04 7.39E-03 4.28E-03 2.00E-03 5.92E-04 9.91E-03 6.57E-03 3.41E-03 1.83E-03 
500 5.62E-03 2.73E-03 1.13E-03 1.06E-04 5.96E-03 3.50E-03 1.45E-03 3.30E-04 7.87E-03 4.89E-03 2.61E-03 9.62E-04 
1000 3.22E-03 1.73E-03 7.33E-04 5.46E-05 3.53E-03 2.26E-03 1.00E-03 1.80E-04 5.26E-03 3.48E-03 1.67E-03 5.48E-04 




300 6.98E-03 3.87E-03 1.41E-03 1.64E-04 8.71E-03 4.56E-03 2.11E-03 5.83E-04 1.06E-02 6.71E-03 3.43E-03 1.65E-03 
500 6.13E-03 2.93E-03 1.18E-03 1.07E-04 6.92E-03 3.74E-03 1.53E-03 3.15E-04 8.75E-03 5.43E-03 2.49E-03 9.19E-04 
1000 4.49E-03 2.20E-03 7.93E-04 5.31E-05 4.17E-03 2.78E-03 1.14E-03 1.49E-04 6.14E-03 3.78E-03 1.75E-03 4.91E-04 








Supplementary Table S2.5 (a,b): (a) RMSE and (b) bias for estimation of specificity when 
the EHR study uses a different liability threshold compared to external GWAS studies. 
 
 (a) 
sample size 1000 5000 
               delta 
alpha_0 
-0.05 0 0.05 0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 
0.85 0.016 0.020 0.027 0.037 0.008 0.012 0.021 0.032 
0.9 0.015 0.018 0.025 0.033 0.007 0.011 0.020 0.032 
0.95 0.011 0.016 0.024 0.033 0.005 0.010 0.019 0.030 
1 0.003 0.009 0.017 0.028 0.001 0.006 0.014 0.026 
*delta: 𝐾𝐸𝐻𝑅 − 𝐾𝐸𝑋 
 
 (b) 
sample size 1000 5000 
               delta 
alpha_0 
-0.05 0 0.05 0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 
0.85 -0.001 -0.005 -0.014 -0.024 0.000 -0.008 -0.018 -0.029 
0.9 0.000 -0.005 -0.013 -0.021 0.000 -0.008 -0.018 -0.030 
0.95 0.001 -0.005 -0.015 -0.022 0.000 -0.007 -0.017 -0.029 
1 -0.001 -0.005 -0.012 -0.021 -0.001 -0.004 -0.013 -0.025 




Supplementary Table S2.6: Empirical type I error for testing whether there is 




                 Size 
prevalence 
300 500 1000 5000 300 500 1000 5000 
4% 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
10% 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 




Supplementary Table S2.7 (a,b):  Power for testing whether there is misspecification under different settings. (a) alpha = 0.05, 
(b) alpha = 0.01. 
(a) alpha = 0.05 
    Prevalence=4% Prevalence=10% Prevalence=15% 
    0.85 0.9 0.95 0.85 0.9 0.95 0.85 0.9 0.95 
True effect size 
300 1.00 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.96 0.72 0.96 0.84 0.53 
500 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.00 0.97 0.69 
1000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.91 
5000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Estimate effect 
size 
300 1.00 0.99 0.92 1.00 0.97 0.83 0.97 0.90 0.64 
500 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.98 0.81 
1000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 
5000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (b) alpha = 0.01 
    Prevalence=4% Prevalence=10% Prevalence=15% 
    0.85 0.9 0.95 0.85 0.9 0.95 0.85 0.9 0.95 
True effect size 
300 0.99 0.97 0.72 0.98 0.89 0.49 0.88 0.68 0.29 
500 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.98 0.74 0.98 0.90 0.49 
1000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.99 0.79 
5000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Estimate effect 
size 
300 1.00 0.98 0.80 0.99 0.93 0.64 0.91 0.77 0.39 
500 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.99 0.85 0.99 0.95 0.61 
1000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.92 





Supplementary Table S2.8: Estimated misclassification rate in observed cases and p-value 
when using different encounter cutoffs to define an AMD case. Holm-Bonferroni method is 
used to control the familywise error rates under 0.05. Numbers in bold represents the results that 
are not significant.  
 
 
Cutoff Cases Controls Estimated (1-𝜶𝟎) p-value 
Holm-Bonferroni 
threshold* 
≥1 encounter 144 16516 0.40% 1.94E-14 3.85E-03 
≥2 encounters 119 16516 0.30% 2.10E-10 4.17E-03 
≥3 encounters 86 16516 0.16% 7.85E-06 4.55E-03 
≥4 encounters 74 16516 0.12% 2.35E-04 5.00E-03 
≥5 encounters 65 16516 0.10% 7.37E-04 5.56E-03 
≥6 encounters 55 16516 0.10% 1.44E-03 6.25E-03 
≥7 encounters 49 16516 0.06% 1.51E-02 7.14E-03 
≥8 encounters 45 16516 0.04% 9.60E-02 8.33E-03 
≥9 encounters 44 16516 0.04% 9.37E-02 1.00E-02 
≥10 encounters 42 16516 0.04% 9.05E-02 1.25E-02 
≥11 encounters 38 16516 0.02% 3.72E-01 1.67E-02 
≥12 encounters 37 16516 0.02% 3.74E-01 2.50E-02 
≥13 encounters 33 16516 0.02% 4.38E-01 5.00E-02 






















Supplementary Table S2.9: The estimation of MAFs in cases and effect sizes for AMD with 
samples defined by different encounter cutoffs. Here the top two common variants with 
largest effect sizes are investigated. Results are compared with those in the external GWAS to 
examine whether they are converge to the external gold-standard GWAS when phenotypes are 
refined by more stringent cutoff. The variant, rs3750846, is around gene ARMS2; and 




  MAF in cases Effect size 
  rs3750846 rs10922109 rs3750846 rs10922109 
≥1 encounter 0.347 0.323 0.634 0.382 
≥2 encounters 0.353 0.315 0.660 0.417 
≥3 encounters 0.384 0.302 0.793 0.477 
≥4 encounters 0.412 0.291 0.912 0.534 
≥5 encounters 0.415 0.277 0.925 0.601 
≥6 encounters 0.400 0.273 0.861 0.622 
≥7 encounters 0.418 0.255 0.938 0.713 
≥8 encounters 0.444 0.233 1.045 0.831 
≥9 encounters 0.455 0.239 1.086 0.802 
≥10 encounters 0.464 0.250 1.126 0.740 
≥11 encounters 0.487 0.237 1.217 0.812 
≥12 encounters 0.500 0.243 1.270 0.777 
≥13 encounters 0.515 0.242 1.330 0.782 
















Supplementary Figure S2.1: Illustration of the influence of different case/control 
dichotomization thresholds on case/control distributions in external GWAS and EHR-
based GWAS. Here EHR has less stringent liability threshold to dichotomize cases than external 
GWAS. The blue area represents samples that are classified as controls in both GWAS. The red 
area represents samples that are classified as cases in both GWAS. The green dots represent the 
samples that are truly misclassified. The purple area represents samples that are classified as 




















Supplementary Figure S2.2(a):  Estimated effect sizes in external case-control study and 
EHR GWAS for age-related macular degeneration. Forty variants listed here are reported to 
be significantly associated with AMD by the International AMD Genomics Consortium and have 
association results in MGI EHR (Fritsche et al., 2016). On the y axis, if multiple variants are 

















Supplementary Figure S2.2(b):  Estimated effect sizes in external case-control study and 
EHR GWAS for breast cancer. Seventy three variants listed here are reported to be 
significantly associated with breast cancer in external studies (Michailidou et al., 2017; 
Michailidou et al., 2015; Michailidou et al., 2013; Fletcher et al., 2011; Turnbull et al., 2010) and 
have association results in MGI EHR. The external GWAS results are the average of effect sizes 
among those five studies. On the y axis, if multiple variants are around the same notable gene, 















Supplementary Figure S2.2(c):  Estimated effect sizes in external case-control study and 
EHR GWAS for psoriasis. Forty one variants listed here are reported to be significantly 
associated with psoriasis in external studies (Tsoi et al., 2015; Yin et al., 2015; Tsoi et al., 2012; 
Strange et al., 2010; Stuart et al., 2010) and have association results in MGI EHR. The external 


















Supplementary Figure S2.2(d):  Estimated effect sizes in external case-control study and 
EHR GWAS for type II diabetes. Seventy seven variants listed here are reported to be 
significantly associated with T2D in external studies (Scott et al., 2017; Gaulton et al., 2015; 
Consortium, Diabetes SAT2D, et al., 2014; Morris et al., 2012; Saxena et al., 2012; Voight et al., 
2010; Zeggini et al., 2008) and have association results in MGI EHR. The external GWAS 
results are the average of effect sizes among those seven studies. On the y axis, if no gene is 













Supplementary Figure S2.3:  Estimated effect sizes in external case-control study and EHR 
GWAS using samples having 7 or more encounters for age-related macular degeneration. 
Thirty six variants listed here are reported to be significantly associated with AMD by the 
International AMD Genomics Consortium and have converged association results in MGI EHR 
(Fritsche et al., 2016). On the y axis, if multiple variants are around the same notable gene, 















Supplementary Figure S2.4(a,b): RMSE for estimation of specificity based on different 
methods; (a) is using true effect sizes and (b) is using estimated effect sizes. Results shown 
here are for settings with disease prevalence 10%. The panel represents true specificity 𝛼0. The 
red line represents results using our method. The blue line and yellow line represent method 
proposed by Tsoi et al. that examines mean differences with exact risk AF and approximate risk 
AF respectively. The green line and purple line represent their method that examines median 




Likelihood-based Protocol for Inferring Genetic Relatives 
Securely between Studies 
3.1 Introduction 
The development of next generation sequencing technologies has benefitted many areas of 
genetic research. Based on whole genome or exome sequencing data, reference datasets of 
human genetic variation have been generated (Karczewski et al., 2019; Taliun et al., 2019). They 
are essential resources for functional interpretation of putative disease-causing variants by, for 
example, helping separate genomic positions and regions that are mutation intolerant from others 
where variation is more common. Electronic health records (EHR) has also been linked to 
sequencing data, for example, the exome sequencing project of UK Biobank samples funded by 
Regeneron Pharmaceuticals (UK Biobank, 2018). These sequencing data from large cohorts can 
be used to establish the reference dataset. As more and more reference resources like dbSNP and 
ClinVar, or custom browsers like gnomAD and BRAVO, became publicly available, aggregated 
information from multiple resources will help researchers make inferences more efficiently and 
comprehensively (Sherry et al., 2001; Landrum et al., 2017; Karczewski et al., 2019; Taliun et al., 
2019). The critical step of the combination of different reference datasets is to infer the 
overlapping samples, as ignoring overlapping samples when combining information will bias the
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summary statistics like allele frequency (AF), especially for rare variants. In turn, ignoring 
overlap will be deleterious for functional interpretation of these variants.  
Various methods have been developed to infer genetic relatives based on individual-level genetic 
data (Lynch, 1988; Queller and Goodnight, 1989; Boehnke and Cox, 1997; Broman and Weber, 
1998; Lynch and Ritland, 1999; Epstein et al. 2000; Wang, 2002; Milligan, 2003; Manichaikul, 
2010; Thomas, 2010). However, methods are lacking for a more challenging problem, inferring 
genetic relatives between different studies. An inherent issue that arises in identifying 
overlapping or closely related samples between studies is privacy. While the summary statistics 
are often shared between studies, it is common that studies are prohibited from sharing 
individual-level data most often because of the informed consent used in the studies. Moreover, 
as more and more genetic data are gathered and stored in large databases, they may become a 
resource for people to find their genetic relatives. Privacy-preserving protocols of inferring 
relatives can also be applied when people who are interested in finding their relatives have 
concerns about releasing genetic data to organizations they may not necessarily trust.  
Several methods initially aiming for secure DNA string searching or edit distance calculation 
have been proposed based on different cryptographic techniques. An extension usage of these 
two-party secure protocols is to identify similar samples, i.e. infer duplicates, between two 
studies based on the edit distance. The protocols include private set intersection (De Cristofaro 
and Tsudik, 2012), oblivious transfer- based hamming distance system (Bringer et al., 2013), as 
well as privacy-preserving approximating edit distance (Wang et al., 2015). These methods can 
infer duplicates by calculating the similarity or distance of encrypted genome sequences. 
However, all of these methods are not constructed based on the biological mechanism of 
inheritance and can only infer duplicates. Another type of method deals with this problem based 
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on the ‘fuzzy’ encryption technique. He et al. (2014) showed that with this ‘fuzzy’ encryption 
method, one individual should be able to decrypt the encrypted genome of another individual 
using his own genome only when they are related. The extension of the method proposed by 
Hormozdiari et al (2014) takes advantage of genetic reference panels and can detect more distant 
relationships using rare variants. However, they also have some limitations. One limitation is that 
they use the haplotype information, which requires phasing of the genotype. Second, these 
methods require sharing information of the whole genome between studies. As a consequence, 
they are not only computationally infeasible for large-scale data, but also have a risk of severe 
information leakage when the encryption is attacked. More importantly, these methods, again, 
are based on comparing the similarity of genome sequences directly, but ignoring the mechanism 
of inheritance. In this chapter, we propose a new protocol that allows efficient detection of 
genetic relatives without compromising privacy while only requiring sharing encrypted 
information of a limited number of variants.  
The secure protocol infers the genetic relationship using a likelihood-based model. This method 
was first proposed by Boehnke and Cox in 1997 and improved by Broman and Weber (1998) and 
Epstein et al. (2000) to incorporate genotyping error. The likelihood-based method has excellent 
power of identifying genetic relatives using true individual-level genotype data. Here, we modify 
this method and enable it to identify relatives using encrypted genotype data. The general 
framework of this protocol between two studies is that study A first releases the encrypted code 
of their genotype segments to study B. Then study B, which has access to its own genotype data 
and the encrypted data from study A, can identify relatives by incorporating the likelihood-based 
method. Under this protocol, kinship coefficients can be obtained without disclosing genetic 
information between studies. We demonstrate the utility of our method by applying our 
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technique to infer genetic relatives among samples from the Trans-Omics for Precision Medicine 
(TOPMed) study. We show that our protocol can infer relationship up to second degree in a 
homogenous population with only a limited number of variants. Furthermore, with selected 
variants, our protocol can identify close relatives in a heterogeneous population. The 
computation time of our protocol scales well in practice. Our method is not limited to EHR 
studies, but can be broadly applied to any genetic studies without additional assumptions. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Likelihood-based method of inferring genetic relatives 
To infer relationship based on likelihoods, we have to construct the probability of observing the 
genotype pairs of two samples given a certain relationship (Boehnke and Cox, 1997; Epstein et 
al., 2000). Then the relationship which maximizes the likelihood is inferred to be the relationship 
between these two samples. 
Let 𝐺𝑚 = (𝐺𝑖𝑚, 𝐺𝑗𝑚) denote the genotype of sample pair (i, j) at variant m. If M independent 
variants are selected to infer relationship, 𝐺 = (𝐺1, 𝐺2, … , 𝐺𝑀) should be the genotype pairs of all 
the M variants for a pair of samples i and j. Then we can infer the relationship based on the 
probability of observing the genotype pairs between the samples given a certain relationship, 
𝑃𝑟 (𝐺|𝑅). The relationship we consider here includes MZ twins/duplicates, parent-offspring, full 
siblings, second degree relatives and unrelated pairs. For example, if 𝑃𝑟 (𝐺|𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑖𝑏) is the 




To calculate 𝑃𝑟 (𝐺|𝑅), we use the identity-by-descent (IBD) status to link the observed genotype 
pairs G and relationship R. Let  𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚 ∈ {0,1,2} denote the number of alleles shared by IBD at 
variant m. Then for a pair of variants 𝐺𝑚 of sample i and j, the probability can be calculated as 
𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑚|𝑅) = ∑ 𝑃𝑟 (𝐺𝑚|𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚 = 𝑑)𝑑={0,1,2} ∙ 𝑃𝑟(𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚 = 𝑑| 𝑅).                     (1) 
The first probability in the equation, Pr(Gm|IBD = i), is the conditional probability of genotype 
pairs at variant m given that they share 0,1 or 2 alleles IBD. These probabilities are provided in 
Table 3.1 for autosomal variants (Thompson, 1975; Risch, 1990). Here we only consider bi-
allelic variants.  
Table 3.1:  Probability of ordered autosomal genotype pairs given IBD status 
𝐏𝐫(𝑮𝒎|𝑰𝑩𝑫𝒎 = 𝟎, 𝟏, 𝟐). 
 
Pr(Genotype pairs|IBD) 

















Given a relationship, we can construct the probability of having IBD status to be 0, 1 or 2 at that 
variant for autosomal variants. For instance, 𝑃𝑟(𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚 = 0,1,2|𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑠) = (0.25,0.5,0.25). 
Table 3.2 shows these probabilities for different relationships. 
Table 3.2: Probability of IBD status given different relationship 𝐏𝐫(𝑰𝑩𝑫𝒎 = 𝟎, 𝟏, 𝟐|𝑹). 
 Pr(IBD|R) 
Relationship IBD=0 IBD=1 IBD=2 
Duplicates/MZ twins 0 0 1 
Parent-offspring 0 1 0 
Full-sib 0.25 0.5 0.25 
Second-degree relatives 0.5 0.5 0 
First-cousin 0.75 0.25 0 




For our protocol, we only select independent variants to infer the relationship. Thus, the joint 
log-likelihood of the genotype pairs of all M variants, given the relationship, should be the log of 
the product of these independent variants,   




= ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ((∑ 𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑚|𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚 = 𝑑) ∙ 𝑃𝑟(𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚 = 𝑑|𝑅)𝑑={0,1,2} ))
𝑀
𝑚=1 .                         (2) 
3.2.2 Genotyping error 
Broman and Weber (1998) demonstrated that if we did not consider genotype errors in the model, 
there would be many probabilities of value 0 introduced in the model through 𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑚|𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚), 
which reduced the accuracy and flexibility of the model. For example, the probability 
𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑚 = (𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏)|𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚 = 1) equals 0 when we ignore genotype errors. However, it is possible 
to get the genotype pair (aa,bb) under IBD = 1 when genotype error is considered. To make the 
model more realistic, they proposed a method considering genotype errors. Suppose each variant 
genotype is wrong with probability 𝜖 and each genotype is correctly determined with probability 
1- 𝜖. The probabilities 𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑚|𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚) becomes the weighted sum of 𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑚|𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚) and 
𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑚|𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚 = 0). The weights are the probabilities that a pair of variants is correctly 
genotyped, (1 − ε)2, and either variant is randomly generated from the population, (1 −
(1 − ε)2 ). Hence,  𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑚|𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚) becomes 
𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑚|𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚 = 𝑑; 𝜀) = (1 − 𝜀)
2 𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑚|𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚 = 𝑑; 𝜀 = 0) 
                                                           +(1 − (1 − 𝜀)2 )𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑚 |𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚 = 0; 𝜀 = 0).            (3) 
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This equation (3) is plugged into (2) to construct a likelihood which takes genotype error into 
consideration, 
          𝑙(𝐺|𝑅, 𝜀) = ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ((∑ 𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑚|𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚 = 𝑑; 𝜀) ∙ 𝑃𝑟(𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑚 = 𝑑|𝑅)𝑑={0,1,2} ))
𝑀
𝑚=1 .         
3.2.3 General secure relationship inference framework 
In the previous section, we demonstrated how to infer genetics relatives using individual-level 
genotypes. To infer relationships between studies when the individual-level genotype is not 
sharable, we need to calculate the likelihood defined above using encrypted genotype data. We 
propose a privacy-preserving framework that allows two studies to infer genetic relatives without 
exposing their individual-level genotype information. Two parties included in this protocol, 
study A and B, should follow these general steps (illustrated in Figure 3.1): 
1) Study A generates encrypted genotype data and sends it to study B. 
2) Study B calculates the likelihood using encrypted genotype from study A and its own 
genotype. Then study B infers the relationship based on the likelihoods. 
 
Figure 3.1: General framework for securely calculating kinship coefficient between studies. 
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3.2.4 Inferring relationships using encrypted genotype by likelihood-based method 
As described in the previous section, to infer relationships securely, the encryption scheme 
should be developed and the likelihood 𝑙(𝐺|𝑅, 𝜀) depending on encrypted genotype should be 
constructed.  
The key concept of encrypting genotypes is to represent true genotype data with summary 
statistics that do not reveal the genotype specifically for each variant, but contains enough 
information to infer relationships. To encrypt genotype data, we first partition an individual’s 
genotype into segments. Each segment contains k number of variants.  Then, we summarize the 
genotypes within each segment as the encrypted code and use them to infer relatives. Let 𝑋𝑖𝑝 
denote the encrypted genotype code for individual i at segment p,  𝑋𝑖𝑝 = ∑ 𝐺𝑖𝑚𝑚∈{𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝}  . 
One example of the encryption scheme with segment size k=3 is shown in Figure 3.2 and Table 
3.3. In this encryption scheme, since the mappings between the encrypted genotype and the true 
genotype segment are one-to-one for (X = 0, G = (000)) and (X = 6, G = (222)), we set their 
encrypted genotype code to be 1and 5 instead of 0 and 6. In turn, the mappings between 
encrypted genotype and true genotype segment are always one-to-N. The information of the 
genotype segment is compressed from 33 distinct values into 5 distinct values. In other words, 
we cannot infer the exact true genotype from the encrypted genotype code. Details of the 
encryption scheme of segment size k = 5 are shown in Supplementary Table S3.1. With segment 
size equaling 5, the genotype is compressed from 243 distinct values to 9 distinct values. In 
Section 3.3 below, we will compare the utility and the security of these two encryption schemes 
through simulations.  
Based on the likelihood constructed in Section 3.2.1-2 as well as the mappings between 
encrypted genotypes and true genotype segments, the joint log-likelihood of the pair of encrypted 
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Table 3.3: Mapping between true genotype and encrypted genotype code (segment size = 3). 
Genotype segment (𝑮) Encrypted genotype code (𝑿) 
000, 001, 010, 100 1 
011, 101, 110, 002, 020, 200 2 
012, 021, 102, 111, 120, 201, 210 3 
022, 112, 121, 202, 211, 220 4 




                       Genotype 𝐺𝑖𝑚                                                                              Encrypted code 𝑋𝑖𝑝 
Individual 1:   011   101   201   221        𝑋𝑖𝑝 = ∑ 𝐺𝑖𝑚𝑚∈{𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝}             Individual 1:         2    2    3     5 
Individual 2:   111   120   001   001                                                              Individual 2:         3    3    1    1 
Individual 3:   201   000   222   201                                                              Individual 3:         3    0    5    3 
Figure 3.2: Demonstration of encrypting genotype with segment size = 3. 
 
genotype from one study and the true genotype from the other study given relationship R is 
obtained by adding all possible conditions for a given encrypted genotype. Based on our protocol, 
for each comparison between sample i and j, genotypes of only one sample, sample i are 
encrypted. Suppose the sequence of genetic variants is divided into P segments. Each segment 
contains k variants. Let 𝑮𝑖𝑝 denote all the possible genotype segments that can be mapped to the 
encrypted genotype code 𝑋𝑖𝑝 in the pth segment, 𝑋𝑖𝑝 = 𝑒𝑛𝑐(𝑮𝑖𝑝) = ∑ 𝐺𝑖𝑚𝑚∈{𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝} . Since 
each variant is independent, each segment should be independent also, and each variant within 
one segment should be independent as well, 𝑃𝑟(𝑮𝑖𝑝, 𝑮𝑗𝑝|𝑅, 𝜀) = ∏ 𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑚|𝑅, 𝜀)𝑚∈{𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝} . 
Hence, the likelihood becomes 
𝑙(𝑿𝑖, 𝑮𝑗|𝑅, 𝜀) = ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑟(𝑋𝑖𝑝, 𝑮𝑗𝑝|𝑅, 𝜀))
𝑝
 












The probability, 𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑚|𝑅, 𝜀), can be calculated using equation (1) and (3). As in the method 
without encryption, the relationship is inferred by selecting the relationship which maximizes the 
likelihood.  
To deal with missing values, if a genotype is missing for a sample in study A which encrypts the 
genotype, the whole segment corresponding to that variant is coded as missing and 
𝑃𝑟(𝑋𝑖𝑝, 𝑮𝑗𝑝|𝑅, 𝜀) is set to be 1 for that segment. If the genotype is missing in study B which uses 
the true genotypes, we treat that variant as missing and 𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑚|𝑅, 𝜀) is set to be 1 for that variant 
3.3 Results  
3.3.1 NHLBI TOPMed program 
The performance of this secure relationship inference protocol is evaluated through application 
to infer relationships among the samples of NHLBI TOPMed program Freeze3 data.   
TOPMed is a program that aims to get insight into the genetic basis of human diseases, including 
heart, lung, blood, and sleep disorders, through whole genome sequencing. The ethnic 
background of the participants in TOPMed program is diverse (Taliun et al., 2019). A reference 
dataset of human genetic variation, BRAVO, has been constructed based on the sequencing data 
providing resources for functional interpretation of the variants (Taliun et al., 2019). Inferring 
relationship securely among TOPMed samples and samples from other programs may allow us 
to aggregate information from multiple resources and develop a more comprehensive picture of 




3.3.2 Performance of the privacy preserving protocol in homogeneous populations 
In the first simulation, we apply our method to infer relationships among homogeneous 
populations in TOPMed program. The ancestry of each individual is estimated using TRACE 
(Wang et al., 2015). Among 14,572 participants, we identify 3,357 Europeans, 3,437 Africans, 
265 Asian and 54 Native Americans. Then relationships are inferred within each ethnic group. 
Gold-standard relationships among samples are inferred using the robust relationship inference 
method implemented in KING based on ~600,000 variants from the Human Genome Diversity 
Project (HGDP), which are considered to have high genotype quality (Cavalli-Sforza , 2005; 
Manichaikul et al. 2010). Then we conduct the secure inference of relationships using 500, 1000, 
5000 and 10000 independent variants. These variants all have minor allele frequencies (MAF) 
around 0.5 (MAF: 0.4~0.5) in the joint population, which is representative of the most 
informative variants. We set the segment size to 3. Since the variants numbers are not a multiple 
of 3, the inference is actually conducted upon 498, 999, 4998, and 9999 variants. 
To mimic the secure protocol, for each pair of samples, we assume the sample with smaller ID is 
from study A; it follows the protocol by encrypting its genotype of the selected variants. The 
sample with larger ID is from study B; it calculates the likelihood and infers the relationship 
based on encrypted data from study A and its own genotype. The allele frequencies we use for 
calculating the likelihood are based on all samples within each ethnic group.   
We infer the relationships using our secure protocol with encrypted genotypes as well as using 
KING with the same set of unencrypted genotypes. The performance is evaluated by comparing 
the results of both methods to the gold standard. Here, considering that our final purpose of 
implementing the method is to identify overlaps between the 2 studies, our primary concern is 
identifying duplicates and 1
st
 degree relatives. 
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Table 3.4 shows the number of relative pairs inferred totally and inferred correctly with different 
numbers of variants. With both methods, all of the duplicate pairs are correctly inferred using 
500 or more variants.  
For 1
st
 degree relatives, the information we lose due to the encryption does not have a large 
impact on the relationship inference. Our method provides comparable results as KING without 
encryption. For instance, with both methods, we do not get false positives in the Asian and 
Native American populations. For the European and African populations, the number of 
correctly identified relative pairs increases and the false discovery rate (FDR) decreases as we 
use more variants. Our secure protocol recovers 100% of the 1
st
 degree relatives and gets 0.15% 
false-positive pairs using 5000 variants for Europeans while KING without encryption identifies 
100% of the 1
st
 degree relatives with no false-positive pairs. For Africans, our method identifies 
99.93% of the 1
st
 degree relatives and gets 0.14% false-positive pairs using 5000 variants while 
KING without encryption identifies all the true pairs with 0.07% false-positive pairs.  
In addition to 1st degree relatives, when using more than 5000 variants, 2
nd
 degree relatives can 
also be identified with a high true positive rate and a low false discovery rate. The compression 
of information in the encrypted data has a large impact on the 2
nd
 degree relative inference, 
which is mainly reflected in the false discovery rate. Using 10000 variants, our secure method 
detects 98.41% of the 2
nd
 degree relatives in Europeans with 28.76% FDR while KING without 
encryption detects 95.66% of the 2
nd
 degree relatives with 5.07% FDR.  Our method detected 
98.47% of the 2
nd
 degree relatives with 3.28% FDR in Africans while KING without encryption 
detected 98.19% of the 2
nd
 degree relatives with 1.72% FDR. Our method has identical 
performance as KING without encryption in Asian and Americans. Overall, in homogeneous 
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populations, our method does not suffer from the information loss due to the encryption and can 
infer relatives up to 2
nd
 degree with high accuracy.   
Table 3.4: Number of relative pairs inferred with 500, 1000, 5000 and 10000 variants 
within each ethnic group using our method (segment size =3) vs. KING without encryption. 




European African Asian American 
Duplicates/MZ twins     
Gold standard  30 30 0 0 
Our method 
500 30(30) 30(30) 0 0 
1000 30(30) 30(30) 0 0 
5000 30(30) 30(30) 0 0 
10000 30(30) 30(30) 0 0 
KING w/o 
encryption 
500 30(30) 30(30) 0 0 
1000 30(30) 30(30) 0 0 
5000 30(30) 30(30) 0 0 
10000 30(30) 30(30) 0 0 
1
st
 degree relatives         
Gold standard  1959 1461 0 0 
Our method 
500 2184(1941) 1522(1448) 0 0 
1000 2070(1956) 1468(1453) 0 0 
5000 1962(1959) 1462(1460) 0 0 
10000 1960(1959) 1461(1461) 0 0 
KING w/o 
encryption 
500 1992(1941) 1475(1451) 0 0 
1000 1972(1951) 1461(1456) 0 0 
5000 1959(1959) 1462(1461) 0 0 
10000 1959(1959) 1461(1461) 0 0 
2
nd
 degree relatives         
Gold standard  2074 1049 1 0 
Our method 
500 68406(1560) 57825(779) 326(1) 5(0) 
1000 9629(1801) 3532(904) 16(1) 0 
5000 3045(2024) 1075(1014) 1(1) 0 
10000 2865(2041) 1068(1033) 1(1) 0 
KING w/o 
encryption 
500 17904(1549) 20306(889) 195(0) 2(0) 
1000 2714(1723) 1638(807) 6(1) 0 
5000 2088(1954) 1045(1020) 1(1) 0 





3.3.3 Performance of the privacy preserving protocol in a heterogeneous population 
The calculation of the likelihood, 𝑙(𝑿𝑖, 𝑮𝑗|𝑅, 𝜀) depends on the allele frequencies of the variants, 
which in turn depend on the population background of the samples. In this section, we 
demonstrate the performance of the method in a heterogeneous population and provide a strategy 
about how to improve the performance of our method in this population.  
In this simulation, relationships are identified among all the 7,113 participants in Section 3.3.2. 
The samples having diverse ethnic backgrounds like European, African, Asian and Native 
American are inferred together, assuming the ancestry information is not known. First we 
conduct the inference of relationships on the same set of independent 500, 1000, 5000 and 10000 
variants that we used for the homogenous population application. The AF of some of these 
variants have significant discrepancies across different ancestries. The difference in ethnic-
specific AF can be as large as 0.86 (0.11 for African vs. 0.98 for Asian). However, since we 
assume the participants are inferred without the ancestry information, the differences in AF are 
ignored. The allele frequencies we incorporate in the likelihood model are calculated based on 
the joint population.  
Table 3.5 and Supplementary Table S3.2 show the number of relative pairs inferred totally and 
inferred correctly with different numbers of variants. All duplicate pairs are correctly inferred 
using 500 or more variants.  
For 1
st
 degree relatives, we are able to identify almost 100% of the related pairs with 1,000 or 
more variants. However, in terms of the false-positive pairs, we do suffer from incorporating the 
biased allele frequencies into the model; in other words, the false discovery rate is inflated. With 
500 variants, about 70% of the inferred 1
st
 degree relatives are not true 1
st
 degree relatives. Even 
with 10000 variants, we still get 11.54% false-positive pairs using our method while the FDR is 
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0% using KING. This result implies that the inflated false positive results using our method are 
substantial when dealing with a heterogeneous population. 
Table 3.5: Number of relative pairs inferred in a heterogeneous population using our 
method (segment size =3) with randomly selected variants vs. using KING without 
encryption. Data in the bracket represents number of correctly inferred pairs compared with 
gold-standard. 
 Method Number of variants 
Number of pairs inferred 
(correctly inferred) 
Duplicates/MZ twins (Gold standard = 60)   













 degree relatives (Gold standard = 3425)   











In order to tackle the inflated false-positive problem, we propose a variant selection strategy. 
Instead of selecting variants randomly, we select variants that have relatively constant allele 
frequencies across different ancestry groups. Variant selection is conducted based on two criteria: 
1) differences of allele frequencies among 4 ancestries are less than 0.1; 2) differences of allele 
frequencies are less than 0.2. In our data, for all independent variants with allele frequency 
ranging from 0.4~0.5, only 789 variants are kept after being filtered by criterion-1. Thus here we 
do not infer the relationship using 1000 or 5000 variants under criterion-1.  
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The false discovery rate in detecting 1
st
 degree relatives decreases significantly when using the 
selected variants compared with using randomly selected variants (Table 3.6, Figure 3.3). For 
instance, with 500 variants, the FDR decreases from 70.08% for randomly selected variants to 
7.21% for criterion-1 based variants and 9.51% for criterion-2 based variants. When the false-
positive result is reduced, the power to infer true related pairs remains the same (99.68% for 
random variants vs. 98.77% for criterion-1 vs. 98.92% for criterion-2). Overall, using more 
variants provides us with more accurate inference. With 5000 variants selected based on 
criterion-2, we are able to detect 99.94% of the 1
st
 degree relatives with a 0.12% FDR. The 
results are almost identical to using KING with the unencrypted genotypes. However, while our 
protocol provides inference of duplicates and 1
st
 degree relatives with high accuracy, the false 
discovery rate of detecting 2
nd
 degree relatives is still not well controlled. The results of detecting 
2
nd
 degree relatives are shown in Supplementary Table S3.3. Unlike for homogenous populations, 
our protocol has a limited utility of inferring 2
nd
 order relatives for heterogeneous populations. 
Table 3.6: Number of relative pairs inferred in a heterogeneous population using our 
method (segment size =3) with variants selected based on different criteria. Data in the 
bracket represents number of correctly inferred pairs compared with gold-standard. 
 Method Number of variants 
Number of pairs inferred 
(correctly inferred) 
Duplicates/MZ twins (Gold standard =60)   
Our method w/ criterion-1 
500 60(60) 
800 60(60) 






 degree relatives ( Gold standard = 3425)   
Our method w/ criterion-1 
500 3646(3383) 
800 3509(3401) 








Figure 3.3: False discovery rate of our method (segment size =3) with different variant-
selection criteria vs. KING without encryption. The green and blue dotted line represent 
results using our method with variants selected by AFs and variants randomly selected, 
respectively. The red solid line represents the results using KING without encryption. 
 
3.3.4 Comparison of the encryption schemes with different segment sizes 
In this analysis, we investigate the utility and security of the encryption schemes with different 
segment sizes. Previously, we evaluated the encryption scheme with a segment size of 3 (Table 
3.6). In this section, the genotype is encrypted under another scheme with a segment size of 5. 
We select 500, 1000 and 5000 variants based on criterion-2. Table 3.7 summarizes the relative 
pairs inferred using this scheme.  
Table 3.3 and Supplementary Table S3.1 show the data compression from the original genotype 
segments to the encryption codes for these two schemes. In terms of security, data is compressed 
more in the scheme with a segment size of 5 than 3 (segment size = 3: 27 values to 5 values vs. 
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segment size = 5: 243 values to 9 values). As a consequence, the scheme with segment size of 5 
is more secure.  
In terms of utility, the scheme with segment size of 3 performs better, especially with a smaller 
number of variants, as shown in Figure 3.4. The FDR is 9.51% for inferring 1
st
 degree relatives 
using 500 variants for the scheme with a segment size of 3 while the FDR for the scheme with a 
segment size of 5 is 68.35%. As the number of variants increases, the issue of the inflated false 
discovery rate is resolved in 1
st
 degree relative inference for the scheme with a segment size of 5 
(FDR = 3.50%). However, the inference of 2
nd
 degree relatives still suffers from the compressed 
information for this scheme. The FDR is 92.33% with 5000 variants (Supplementary Table S3.4). 
In other words, the scheme with a segment size of 5 does not have the ability to infer 2
nd
 degree 
relatives with fewer than 5000 variants.   
Table 3.7: Number of relative pairs inferred in a heterogeneous population using our 
method (segment size =5) with variants selected based on criterion-2. Data in the bracket 
represents number of correctly inferred pairs compared with gold-standard. 
Number of variants Number of pairs inferred (correctly inferred) 










3.3.5 Two-step computational strategy and computational cost of the protocol 
Recall the form of the log-likelihood,  





Here we take the scheme with segment size 3 as an example. The encrypted genotype code 𝑋𝑖𝑝 is 
element in {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, missing}. The genotype segment of 3 variants takes 43= 64 distinct 
values since each genotype in the segment is element in {0, 1, 2, missing}. As a consequence, 
the (𝑋𝑝, 𝑮𝑝) pair takes a value in a limited set that has 384 distinct values. Given a relationship 
and segment p, the probability 𝑃𝑟(𝑋𝑝, 𝑮𝑝|𝑅, 𝜀) for a certain (𝑋𝑝, 𝑮𝑝) pair should be the same no 
matter which 2 samples we compare. In other words, when inferring relationships between large 
cohorts, the same 𝑃𝑟(𝑋𝑝, 𝑮𝑝|𝑅, 𝜀) is used repeatedly. 
 
Figure 3.4: False discovery rate of our method with segment size = 3 vs. segment size = 5. 
The red and green line represent results using our method with segment size equals 3 and 5, 
respectively. 
 
In order to make the protocol more efficient to deal with large cohorts, the calculation of the 
likelihood is conducted in two steps. In step one, we calculate the probability 𝑃𝑟(𝑋𝑝, 𝑮𝑝|𝑅, 𝜀) for 
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all possible (𝑋𝑝, 𝑮𝑝)  pairs, all relationships and all segments. The results are saved with unique 
labels depending on p, R, and values of 𝑋 and 𝐺. Then in step two, we calculate the likelihood 
for each pair of samples i and j, ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑟(𝑋𝑖𝑝, 𝑮𝑗𝑝|𝑅, 𝜀))𝑝 , by direct calling the value of 
𝑃𝑟(𝑋𝑝, 𝑮𝑝|𝑅, 𝜀). 
Computational time and memory usage is measured by applying the protocol on the 
heterogeneous population of 7,113 samples using variants selected based on criterion-2. Table 
3.8 shows the computational time of each step in the protocol under different scenarios.  
For study A, the encryption only takes several seconds for 10000 samples (0.8s for 500 variants 
and 10.5s for 5000 variants).  
The step of the inference conducted by study B which contains two steps is more time-
consuming. The computational time of step one does not depend on the number of samples we 
investigate. For scheme1, it scales well in practice, taking less than one minute for 500 variants 
and 1.9 CPU hours for 5000 variants. The computation time grows approximately quadratically 
with the number of variants. For step 2, the computation time of each pair of sample grows 
linearly with the number of variants while the total computation time grows linearly with sample 
sizes in Study A and B. For example, using 500 variants, each comparison takes 0.89ms. Then 
for two studies both having 10000 samples, the total comparison across studies requires 24.7 
CPU hours. Compared with the computing time for step 2, the computational overhead arising 
from step 1 can be ignored. With 500 variants using scheme1, the whole process takes about 25 
CPU hours. 
For scheme 2, since both the encrypted genotype code 𝑋𝑖𝑝 ∈ {1,2, . . ,9, 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔} and the true 
genotype sequence (45= 1024) have more distinct values, step 1 is less efficient compared with 
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scheme1, taking 14 minutes for 500 variants and 26.5 CPU hours for 5000 variants. For step 2, it 
is also less efficient. Based on our analysis in Section 3.3.4, with scheme 2, we need 5000 
variants to get a reasonable inference, which will take 8932.5 CPU hours for step 2, with the 
whole process taking 8959 CPU hours for 10000 samples vs. 10000 samples comparison.  
In terms of memory usage, the pre-calculated values in step 1 need to be stored determined by 
the size of the segment and number of variants. For the encryption scheme with a segment size of 
3, on average it requires 1.5MB memory to store the values for 500 variants and 14.6MB for 
5000 variants. For the scheme with segment size of 5, it requires 234.4MB and 2343.8MB 
respectively.   
Table 3.8: Computing time of each step in the protocol and memory usage in Step1 for 















500 0.08ms 52.68s 0.89ms 1.5MB 
1000 0.17ms 209.19s 1.92ms 2.9MB 
5000 1.05ms 6717.01s 11.90ms 14.6MB 
Scheme2- 
size 5 
500 0.07ms 850.86s 29.78ms 234.4MB 
1000 0.13ms 2938.55s 49.37ms 468.8MB 
5000 0.87ms 95427.43s 321.57ms 2343.8MB 
 
3.4 Discussion 
In this chapter, we have proposed a protocol to infer genetic relatives between studies without 
compromising privacy. The protocol depends on a likelihood-based model to infer relationships 
based on genotype data. It encrypts individual-level genotypes by dividing genotypes into 
segments and using summary statistics to represent the information in each segment.  
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Demonstrated in the real data simulation using TOPMed samples, our novel protocol is able to 
identify most of the 1
st
 degree relatives while controlling the false discovery rate well with 
randomly selected variants in homogenous populations. By applying the two-step strategy for 
likelihood calculation, we show that the secure protocol scales well for large-scale studies. By 
comparing two encryption schemes with different segment sizes, we demonstrate that they both 
have pros and cons in terms of security, utility and computation efficiency.  
The inference of relatedness has been shown to be highly associated with allele frequencies. 
With the development of genotyping technologies, quite a few methods have been proposed to 
infer genetic relationships based on allele frequencies of the genotypes. For example, one kind of 
method infers relationships by calculating relatedness coefficient (Lynch, 1988; Queller and 
Goodnight, 1989; Lynch and Ritland, 1999; Wang, 2002; Milligan, 2003; Thomas, 2010). 
Another kind of method infers relationships more accurately using a likelihood ratio model that 
compared multipoint probability of markers conditional on relationships (Boehnke and Cox, 
1997; Broman and Weber, 1998; Epstein et al. 2000). The inference of relatedness based on all 
of these methods has been shown to be highly correlated with allele frequencies. The methods 
are only consistent or unbiased under the assumption that the allele frequencies are known 
without errors (Lynch and Ritland, 1999; Wang, 2002). Previous studies have shown that when 
biased reference allele frequencies are incorporated in practice, the estimates of relatedness are 
biased, leading to inaccurate relationship inference (Anderson and Weir, 2007; Wang, 2014; 
Wang, 2017). The problem of the inaccurate allele frequency, similarly, leads to the biggest 
limitation of our method about inferring relationships in the population with diverse ethnic 
backgrounds. One essential assumption of our method is that allele frequencies of the variants 
should be the same across all the samples in the study. This assumption is violated in 
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heterogeneous populations where allele frequencies vary across distinct ethnic groups. If 
applying the allele frequencies of the joint population, we will get a biased likelihood, which 
endangers our relationship inference. As a consequence, we are more likely to infer an unrelated 
pair to be relatives. To diminish the effect of population stratification, we introduce a variant 
selection strategy. We select variants that have consistent allele frequencies across different 
ethnic groups to infer the relationships. In this way, we resolve the problem to the extent that we 
can infer the 1
st
 degree relatives with high accuracy and a controlled false discovery rate. 
However, this solution does have limitation in solving real data problems when retrieving the 
ethnic information requires a lot of effort. The variant selection strategy only solves the problem 
under certain scenarios.    
Since more and more reliable reference recourses of human variants have become available in 
database like dbSNP (Sherry et al., 2001), we can also address this problem by applying ethnic-
specific AFs reported in the reference recourses to our model. Such AFs may better represent the 
true AFs of each individual, so that the issue of the inflated false discovery rate will be resolved. 
In order to assign the correct ethnic-specific AFs to each individual, the ancestry information 
should be shared between studies. A caveat is that for an admixed sample, a method to calculate 
his/her AFs accurately based on the AFs within each ethnic group is required.     
Other than assisting our inference in heterogeneous population, the reference allele frequency, on 
the other hand, may also lead to attacks to our encryption scheme. Homer et al. (2008) claimed 
that, under certain conditions, by comparing the MAFs of a specific individual to the distribution 
of MAFs in a reference population, they could use statistical methods to infer the presence of an 
individual with known genotype in a mix of DNA. It raises the concern about the security of 
sharing summary statistics between studies. In our protocol, we encrypt genotypes using the 
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summary statistics. Even though we demonstrate the underlying individual-level genotype 
cannot be disclosed directly from the encrypted code, our protocol still has the risk of 
information leakage when we compare the summary statistic against the reference AFs. For 
example, if a variant has low AF in the reference, some segments with genotype equals 0 for that 
variant may have higher probability than others. As a consequence, the genotype information 
may be disclosed when only one segment has genotype that equals 0 at that position among all 
segments corresponding to a certain encrypted code. Here, we protect our protocol against such 
attack by avoiding using variants with lower AFs. Even with the reference information, we 
cannot guess with confidence of the genotype for a common variant with AF around 0.5. 
Another attack occurs when variants within one segment are in high linkage disequilibrium (LD). 
In this situation, segments having the same genotype at each position, like 000, 111 and 222, 
have much higher probability than others. In our protocol, we address this issue by only 
examining independent variants. In the future, we may protect our scheme against these attacks 
using the differential privacy technique (Uhlerop et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2014). It adds reasonable 
noise to the summary statistic before its release. Then, the likelihood based on the genotype 
summary statistic with noise should be constructed to infer the relationship.  
In conclusion, we propose a privacy preserving protocol that enables the relationship inference 
between studies without disclosing individual-level data. The method has limitations in inferring 
relationships in population with diverse ancestry when the ancestry information is not known. 
Thus, we need further investigation to make the protocol more practical for heterogeneous 
population. In the next chapter, we will propose another privacy preserving method that can infer 





Supplementary Table S3.1: Mapping between encrypted genotype and true genotype for 
encryption scheme with segment size = 5. Information is compressed from 243 distinct values 
into 9 distinct values. 




00000, 00001, 00010, 00100,01000,10000 1 
00011, 00101, 01001,10001,00110,01010,10010,01100,10100,11000, 00002, 
00020, 00200,02000,20000 
2 
12000, 20100, 11100, 02100, 10200, 01200, 20010, 21000, 11010, 02010, 10110, 
01110, 00210, 10020, 01020, 00120, 20001, 11001, 02001, 10101, 01101, 00201, 
10011, 01011, 00111, 00021, 10002, 01002, 00102, 00012  
3 
22000,21100,12100, 20200, 11200, 02200, 21010, 12010, 20110, 11110, 02110, 
10210, 01210, 20020, 11020, 02020, 10120, 01120, 00220, 21001, 12001, 20101, 
11101, 02101, 10201, 01201, 20011, 11011, 02011, 10111, 01111, 00211, 10021, 
01021, 00121, 20002, 11002, 02002, 10102, 01102, 00202, 10012, 01012, 00112, 
00022  
4 
22100, 21200, 12200, 22010, 21110, 12110, 20210, 11210, 02210, 21020, 12020, 
20120, 11120, 02120, 10220, 01220, 22001, 21101, 12101, 20201, 11201, 02201, 
21011, 12011, 20111, 11111, 02111, 10211, 01211, 20021, 11021, 02021, 10121, 
01121, 00221, 21002, 12002, 20102, 11102, 02102, 10202, 01202, 20012, 11012, 
02012, 10112, 01112, 00212, 10022, 01022, 00122 
5 
22200, 22110, 21210, 12210, 22020, 21120, 12120, 20220, 11220, 02220, 22101, 
21201, 12201, 22011, 21111, 12111, 20211, 11211, 02211, 21021, 12021, 20121, 
11121, 02121, 10221, 01221, 22002, 21102, 12102, 20202, 11202, 02202, 21012, 
12012, 20112, 11112, 02112, 10212, 01212, 20022, 11022, 02022, 10122, 01122, 
00222  
6 
22210, 22201, 22111, 21211, 12211, 22120, 21220, 12220, 22021, 21121, 12121, 
20221, 11221, 02221, 22102, 21202, 12202, 22012, 21112, 12112, 20212, 11212, 
02212, 21022, 12022, 20122, 11122, 02122, 10222, 01222 
7 
22220, 22211, 22121, 21221, 12221, 22202, 22112, 21212, 12212, 22022, 21122, 
12122, 20222, 11222, 02222 
8 









Supplementary Table S3.2: Number of 2
nd
 degree relative pairs inferred in a heterogeneous 
population using our method (segment size = 3) with randomly selected variants vs. using 
KING without encryption. Data in the bracket represents number of correctly inferred pairs 
compared with gold-standard. The gold standard is 3127 pairs. 
 Method Number of variants 
Number of pairs inferred 
(correctly inferred) 












Supplementary Table S3.3: Number of 2
nd
 degree relative pairs inferred in a heterogeneous 
population using our method (segment size = 3) with variants selected based on different 
criteria. Data in the bracket represents number of correctly inferred pairs compared with gold-
standard. The gold standard is 3127 pairs. 
Method Number of variants 
Number of pairs inferred 
(correctly inferred) 
Our method w/ criterion 1 
500 257063(2430) 
800 54505(2584) 





Supplementary Table S3.4: Number of 2
nd
 degree relative pairs inferred in a heterogeneous 
population using our method (segment size = 5) with variants selected based on criterion 2. 
Data in the bracket represents number of correctly inferred pairs compared with gold-standard. 
The gold standard is 3127 pairs. 
Number of variants 









Robust Method for Identifying Genetic Relatives between 
Studies without Compromising Privacy 
4.1 Introduction 
As described in the previous chapter, personal genomics in the setting of electronic health 
records (EHR) studies has gained much interest recently due to the need to infer genetic relatives 
between studies. In Chapter III we proposed a secure protocol that can infer close relatives with 
high accuracy without disclosing individual-level data. However, its performance in dealing with 
a heterogeneous population is deteriorated by the differences in allele frequency among ancestry 
groups. In addition, none of the existing methods mentioned in Chapter III, including the private 
set intersection (De Cristofaro and Tsudik, 2012), oblivious transfer-based hamming distance 
system (Bringer et al., 2013), privacy-preserving approximating edit distance (Wang et al., 2015) 
as well as the “fuzzy” encryption methods, have been evaluated under multi-ethnic scenarios, i.e. 
heterogenous population. In this chapter, we try to overcome this limitation and propose a novel 
protocol that allows detection of genetic relatives among multi-ethnic groups without 
compromising privacy.  
Our protocol securely infers genetic relatives by combining the robust relationship inference 
method previously described by Manichaikul et al. (2010) and an encryption technique called 
homomorphic encryption (Gentry, 2009; Fan and Vercauteren, 2012). It has several advantages.
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First, our protocol only requires the sharing of a limited number of variants so that the 
computation of our protocol scales well in practice. Second, our protocol is robust to population 
stratification. The method proposed by Manichaikul et al. (2010) infers genetic relatives using 
kinship coefficients. It has been shown to have reliable performance even under scenarios where 
population stratification and violation of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium (HWE) are present. 
Moreover, the security of our protocol is guaranteed theoretically by the rigorous proof for 
homomorphic encryption (Gentry, 2009).    
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption that allows one to conduct calculations on 
encrypted data without first decrypting the data where only people with the decryption key can 
decrypt the result. The encrypted result, when decrypted, matches the result of calculations 
performed on the real data. Gentry first constructed the fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) 
scheme which enables one to perform arbitrary computations on encrypted data; however, 
implementations of FHE are generally inefficient (Gentry, 2009).  More recently, a more 
practical scheme called the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme (SWHE) was proposed 
by Fan and Vercauteren (2012). It allows us to evaluate a limited number of operations, which is 
proved to be sufficient for calculating kinship coefficient in our framework.  
Previously, practical homomorphic encryption schemes have been widely applied to genetic data. 
Much of the work primarily focuses on the problem of pattern matching for genomic sequences. 
For example, Blanton et al. (2012) proposed a method for genome sequencing comparison using 
garbled circuits. Cheon et al. (2015) proposed a method to calculate edit distance on 
homomorphically encrypted data. Later, the efficiency of edit distance calculation and string 
searching were improved by using more efficient homomorphic encryption schemes (Kim and 
Lauter, 2015; Shimizu et al., 2016). On the other hand, homomorphic encryption has also been 
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applies to conduct statistical tests in genetics. One study presented the encryption scheme that 
allowed secure outsourcing of GWAS results to external data center (Kantarcioglu et al., 2008).  
Ayday et al. (2013) showed how to use additive homomorphic encryption to predict disease 
susceptibility securely using genetic information. In addition, Lauter et al. (2014) conducted 
genetic tests for HWE and linkage disequilibrium (LD) securely using the leveled homomorphic 
encryption scheme. Later, by incorporating an honest-but-curious key manager, Ugwuoke et al. 
(2017) improved the efficiency of the test for LD. The method proposed by Kim and Lauter 
(2015) showed the utility of homomorphic encryption in calculating minor allele frequency and 
chi-square statistic in GWAS. Homomorphic encryption has been applied to solve problems in 
multiple fields of genetic studies, however, for our particular purpose of inferring genetic 
relatives, the method based on this technique is still lacking.  
Thus, in this Chapter, we address the problem of relationship inference between studies by 
applying homomorphic encryption in our protocol. Kinship coefficients can be obtained without 
disclosing any genetic information between studies. Through simulations, we show that our 
protocol successfully encrypts genetic data and decrypts kinship coefficient results under 
different scenarios. Our performance is identical to using KING with unencrypted genotypes. 
Furthermore, we demonstrate the utility of our method by applying our technique to infer genetic 
relatives among samples from the Trans-Omics for Precision Medicine (TOPMed) study and the 
Genome Aggregation Dataset (gnomAD) (Karczewski et al., 2019; Taliun et al., 2019). 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Robust genetic relative inference in the presence of population structure 
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First, we describe how to infer genetic relatives with unencrypted data in diverse ethnic groups, 
using a robust method proposed by Manichaikul et al. in 2010. It is implemented in the KING 
software. For simplicity, we call this method KING in this chapter.  
Let 𝜙𝑖𝑗 denote the kinship coefficient between sample i and j, which is the probability of two 
alleles randomly selected from two individuals are identical by descent. KING provides a robust 
estimator for 𝜙𝑖𝑗 based on M pairs of variants without missing genotypes in both individual i and 
j. The details of deriving the robust estimator are provided in the Supplementary note 1. 






(𝑗)  , 
where 𝑁𝐴𝑎
(𝑖)
 is the total number of heterozygotes for the i-th individual among the M variants. 
𝑁𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 is the total numbers of variants at which the individuals of the pair are heterozygous. 
Finallly, 𝑁𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎 is the total numbers of variants at which individuals of the pair are homozygous 
of different alleles.  
In the paper by Manichaikul et al, a more robust estimator was proposed to deal with a situation 
when the violation of HWE of some variants results in excessive heterozygosity.  


























Table 4.1: Relationship inference criteria for kinship coefficient. 
Relationship 𝝓  Inference criteria 
MZ twin >1/23/2 
Parent-offspring/Full-sib (1/25/2, 1/23/2) 





4.2.2 Procedures of homomorphic encryption and a general secure relationship 
inference framework  
To infer genetic relatives securely, we need to calculate the kinship coefficient defined above 
using encrypted genotype data. The homomorphic encryption technique enables us to perform 
the computation on encrypted data without knowing any decryption information.  The general 
procedure of homomorphic encryption is shown in Figure 4.1. It includes: 
Key-generation: generating public key (pk) and secure keys (sk) based on pre-specified 
parameters; 
Encryption: encrypting plaintext to ciphertext using public key; 
Evaluation: calculating on ciphertext, practical homomorphic encryption schemes only 
support addition and multiplication; 
Decryption: decrypting ciphertext using secure key.  
Based on these procedures, we propose a privacy-preserving framework that allows two studies 
to infer genetic relatives without exposing their individual-level genotype information. Two 
parties included in this protocol have such responsibilities: 
Study A: generates the public and secure keys to encrypt data and decrypts the result. 




Figure 4.1: General procedures of homomorphic encryption. Here, pk and sk denote public 
key and security key, respectively; m1 and m2 denote the message before encryption; c1 and c2 
denote the encrypted ciphertext; c_add and c_multi denote the encrypted results of addition or 
multiplication of the ciphertext. 
 
The protocol follows these general steps: 
1) Study A generates keys (pk,sk), encrypts its genotype using pk and sends it to study B.  
2) Study B calculates encrypted kinship coefficients using encrypted genotype from study A 
and its own genotype. Then sends the encrypted result back to study A. 
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3) Study A decrypts the result to get kinship coefficient using sk and makes inference of the 
relationship. 
4.2.3 Somewhat homomorphic encryption 
Given that only a limited number of operations are needed for kinship coefficient calculation, we 
used the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Fan and Vercauteren (FV, 
2012) for the relationship inference. This homomorphic encryption supports both addition and 
multiplication on the encrypted data. The details of this encryption scheme are shown below. 
Notation and parameters  
Our customized FV scheme operates in the ring 𝑅 ≝  ℤ[𝑋]/(𝑋𝑛 + 1), whose elements are 
polynomials with integer coefficients of degree less than n. We call 𝑋𝑛 + 1 the polynomial 
modulus. Usually n is set to be a power of 2. Messages (plaintext), encrypted messages 
(ciphertexts), public and secure keys are elements in the ring R. The notation [a]q  is to denote 







Suppose the plaintext space is 𝑅𝑡 ≝  ℤ𝑡[𝑋]/(𝑋
𝑛 + 1) whose elements are polynomials with 
integer coefficients modulo t. t is called the plaintext modulus. Suppose the ciphertext space is 
𝑅𝑞 ≝  ℤ𝑞[𝑋]/(𝑋
𝑛 + 1) whose elements are polynomials with integer coefficients modulo q. q is 
called the coefficient modulus. 
Let 𝒙 ← 𝐷 denotes that 𝒙 is sampled from distribution 𝐷. Two distributions are relevant to our 
scheme, 𝑅𝑞 and  𝜒𝑒𝑟𝑟. Here 𝑅𝑞 is a uniform distribution on the 𝑅𝑞 space. For example, 𝑅3 is the 
uniform distribution of polynomials with coefficients in {-1,0,1}. 𝜒𝑒𝑟𝑟 is the distribution of error 
that we add to encrypt the data. We use discrete Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 𝜎 for the distribution 𝜒𝑒𝑟𝑟.  
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Encoding of the message 
Since all operations are done in the ring space, to encrypt an integer 𝜇, we should first encode it 
as a polynomial-plaintext 𝑚 ∈ 𝑅. One general way is to take bit-decomposition of 𝜇 and use bits 
as coefficients of the polynomial. For instance, if we take base of 2, for integer 𝜇 =
∑ 𝜇𝑖2
𝑖
𝑖 (𝜇𝑖 ∈ {0,1}), the corresponding plaintext should be 𝑚 = ∑ 𝜇𝑖𝑋
𝑖
𝑖 . However, in a later 
section we will show that the raw data used in our protocol are 0 and 1 which are already in the 
polynomial-plaintext format. The encoding step is not necessary for our protocol.  
Formal definition of the steps in the encryption scheme 
Then the FV encryption scheme is defined as follows: 
KeyGen(params): sample 𝒔 ← 𝑅3, 𝒂 ← 𝑅𝑞 and 𝒆 ← 𝜒𝑒𝑟𝑟. Then the public key (pk) and secure 
key (sk) should be 
𝑝𝑘 = ([−𝒂 ∙ 𝒔 + 𝒆]𝑞 , 𝒂);     𝑠𝑘 = 𝒔. 
Encrypt(pk,m): let m be the message and 𝒎 ∈ 𝑅𝑡, let 𝒑𝟎 = 𝑝𝑘[0], 𝒑𝟏 = 𝑝𝑘[1], sample 
𝒖 ← 𝑅3, 𝒆𝟏, 𝒆𝟐 ← 𝜒𝑒𝑟𝑟. Then message can be encrypted by 





, [𝒑𝟏 ∙ 𝒖 + 𝒆𝟐]𝑞). 






. The last term that contains the message is masked by the term 𝒂 ∙ 𝒔 ∙ 𝒖 which has 
equivalently large polynomial degree as ⌊
𝑞
𝑡
⌋ ∙ 𝒎. The second term of the ciphertext 
becomes 𝑐𝑡[1] = [𝒂 ∙ 𝒖 + 𝒆𝟐]𝑞. Therefore if knowing the secure key 𝒔, we can multiply 𝒔 and  
𝑐𝑡[1] and use it to remove the large term in 𝑐𝑡[0] to decrypt the message. 
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Decrypt(sk,m): let 𝒄𝟎 = 𝑐𝑡[0], 𝒄𝟏 = 𝑐𝑡[1]. Then decrypted ciphertext should be 
[⌊
𝑡 ∙ [𝒄𝟎 + 𝒄𝟏 ∙ 𝒔]𝑞
𝑞
⌉]𝑡. 






only contains the message and random errors having coefficient much smaller than ⌊
𝑞
𝑡
⌋. If we 
rescale the coefficients of this polynomial back to values in mod t and round them, we can 
remove the errors and recover the message m.  
Add(𝒄𝒕𝟏, 𝒄𝒕𝟐): Given two ciphertext 𝑐𝑡1, 𝑐𝑡2, then the addition of them should be 
𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑑 ≔ ([𝑐𝑡1[0] + 𝑐𝑡2[0]]𝑞 , [𝑐𝑡1
[1] + 𝑐𝑡2[1]]𝑞). 
Since later we show that our protocol does not depend on multiplication of the ciphertexts, 
details of the multiplication step are not provided here. 
For this protocol, the FV encryption scheme is implemented using a C++ library, SEAL v2.3.0 
(Bajard et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017). 
Selection of parameters 
The utility, security and efficiency of the FV encryption scheme depend on the choice of 
encryption parameters. 
First of all, each ciphertext contains noise, which grows in all homomorphic operations, and 
eventually reaches a maximum value. Once this maximum is reached, the ciphertext cannot be 
decrypted correctly. Thus to achieve the utility of the encryption scheme, the choice of 




In terms of efficiency, the operations on polynomials with smaller degree and smaller 
coefficients are more efficient. Given a certain level of security, it is important to set the 
parameters that can achieve the balance between efficiency and utility.    
As demonstrated above, the encryption scheme contains four main parameters, polynomial 
modulus 𝑋𝑛 + 1, plaintext modulus t, coefficient modulus q and standard deviation 𝜎 of the error 
distribution. 
The polynomial modulus 𝑋𝑛 + 1 mainly affects the security level of the scheme. The larger the n 
is, the more secure the scheme will be. In addition, larger n leads to larger ciphertext sizes and 
consequently slower operations. The coefficient modulus q affects the utility of the scheme. 
Larger q allows more complicated computations. However, a larger q also lowers the security 
level of the scheme. The plaintext modulus t has an opposite effect on the utility. Smaller t 
allows more complicated computations. 
SEAL provides the default value of parameters for different security levels based on security 
level estimates (Chase et al., 2017). Later in our simulation study, we will provide the optimal 
parameter selection for our protocol under different situations.  
4.2.4 Encryption of genetic data and secure relationship inference protocol 
Since only addition and multiplication are supported by the FV encryption scheme, in order to 





(𝑗) , we have to calculate the denominator and 
numerator separately.  
To calculate the numerator, rather than encrypting directly on genotype {0,1,2}, we compute 3 
ciphertexts for one variant which indicate the genotype equals 0, 1 and 2 respectively. In this 
way, the count numbers, 𝑁𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 and 𝑁𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎 can be calculated by summing the corresponding 
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 denote the ciphertext for individual i at variant m. Let 𝑔
(𝑖,𝑚)
 denote the true 
genotype of sample i at variant m. And 𝐼(𝑔
(𝑖,𝑚)
= 𝑘) is the indicator function of the genotype. 






















 denote the true genotype indicator for study B. Then 𝑁𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 − 2𝑁𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎 















𝑚 ).𝑚𝑚      (1)                    
Since for study B, 𝑔
(𝑗,𝑚)
 is a known value without encryption, this calculation only requires 
addition of the ciphertexts. 
For the denominator, we treat 𝑁𝐴𝑎
(𝑗)
 as a sharable summary statistic. Study B should send the 
unencrypted heterozygous count 𝑁𝐴𝑎
(𝑗)






multiplied it by the statistic (1) to get the kinship coefficient. 
In practice, individuals may have missing genotypes. In the definition of the kinship coefficient, 
all the calculations are done with M pairs of variants without missing genotypes in both 
individuals of a pair. The missing value does not affect the calculation of the numerator that the 
missing genotype results in three indicator values equals 0 so that variants having missing value 
in either individual are not included in the calculation of the numerator automatically. However, 
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. We assume the missing information is 
not as sensitive as the genotype so it can be shared between studies. Along with the encrypted 
and decrypted information, two studies should share vectors 𝑀𝑖 and 𝑀𝑗 indicating whether 
variants are missing in their data. 
Then, the secure protocol of inferring relationships between two studies follows the following 
steps (illustrated in Figure 4.2): 
1) Two studies share their missing data information for each variant.  
2) Study A generates keys (pk,sk), encrypts their genotype to be 𝐶0, 𝐶1, 𝐶2 using pk and 
calculates heterozygous count 𝑁𝐴𝑎
(𝑖)
 for each sample based on the missing information. 
Then study A sends the encrypted genotype to study B.  
3) Study B uses their genotype 𝐺0, 𝐺1, 𝐺2 and encrypted genotype from study A to calculate 
encrypted numerator of the kinship coefficient. Then calculates 𝑁𝐴𝑎
(𝑗)
 and sends the results 
to study A. 
4) Study A decrypts the numerator using sk and calculates the kinship coefficient. 
 
Figure 4.2: The specific process for securely calculating kinship coefficient between studies. 
Here, (1) denotes 𝑁𝐴𝑎
(𝑖)
; (2) denotes 𝑁𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 − 2𝑁𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎̂
(𝑖,𝑗)






The security of data of study A is always guaranteed by the security proof of homomorphic 
encryption (Gentry, 2009; Martin et al, 2015). Without knowing the security key, for study B, the 
encrypted genotype of study A is no more than a random value. However, data of study B may 
have the risk of getting disclosed when study A is an untrusted party. Here we demonstrate three 
possible attacks through which study A can disclose genotype of study B and we show how to 
protect data of study B again those attacks. To simplify the notation in this section, we combine 
three indicator vectors, 𝑔0, 𝑔1, 𝑔2 for one sample i into one vector of length 3M, where M is the 
number of variants.  
Attack I: Function privacy 
The homomorphic encryption scheme implemented in SEAL makes no attempt to keep 
information secure from the owner of the secret key (Chen et al., 2017). In other words, the 
owner of the secret key, study A, can distinguish the noise from the output ciphertext, and 
deduce information about the function study B uses to get the output. For example, the highest 
power that is computed can be read from the size of the output ciphertext which may reveal the 
operations study B conducts.   
To protect data of study B from disclosing, we incorporate a modified noise flooding method 
proposed by Gentry (Gentry, 2009). The main idea of this method is to mask the noise in the 
encrypted result that may reveal information of study B by adding encrypted zeros from B side. 
The encrypted zero should have noise that is polynomially equal or larger than the noise in the 
original encrypted result so that the old noise is flooded. To be specific, in our protocol, the noise 
in the encrypted 𝑁𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 and 𝑁𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎 is result from 5M or less additions of the ciphertexts. 
Therefore in order to mask the noise in the true encrypted result, we added 5M encrypted zeros 
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to the encrypted result. The new encrypted result is 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝑁𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 − 2𝑁𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎) + ∑ 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑚(0)
5𝑀
𝑚=1 . 
Study A is still able to get the true value after decryption. At the same time, the noise in the 
encrypted zeros has similar order of magnitude as the noise in the true encrypted result. As a 
consequence, even with the security key, study A is not able to distinguish the noise of the true 
result from the noise in the zero-added result. Thus they are not able to uncover the data or 
function study B uses.  
Attack II: Artificial genotype 
In this protocol, two studies should share the summary statistic 𝑁𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 − 2𝑁𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎 in order to 
calculate kinship coefficient. The summary statistic will not reveal specific genotype at each 
position if it is calculated based on the true indicator function of the genotype.  
However, by encrypting ‘artificial’ genotypes instead of the indicator 0/1, study A may uncover 
the information of study B through the summary statistics. For example, study A encrypts 
(1, 𝑎 , … , 𝑎𝑀−1,  −0.5𝑎𝑀, … , −0.5𝑎3𝑀−1). Then the summary statistic, 𝑁𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 −
2𝑁𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎, becomes ∑ 𝑔1
(𝑗,𝑚+1) ∙ 𝑎𝑚 +𝑀−1𝑚=0 ∑ 𝑔0




the true genotype of study B from this summary statistic is just converting an integer from base-
10 to base-a. Since study B cannot tell whether study A is cheating from the encrypted data 
without the secure key, we propose a modified protocol guaranteeing that study A can get the 
true value of the summary statistic only when it does not cheat. 
Suppose 𝑁𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 − 2𝑁𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎 is calculated based on M variants, by definition, this summary 
statistic should be an integer in [-2M, M], which contains 3M+1 different integers in total. So 
that if we add a random multiple of the integer 3M+1 to the 𝑁𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 − 2𝑁𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎, then take modulus 
3M+1 and map the value back to [-2M, M], we should be able to get the true value of the 
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summary statistic. However, if study A uses the ‘artificial’ information, 
(1, 𝑎 , … , 𝑎M−1,  −0.5𝑎M, … , −0.5𝑎3M−1), the value of the summary statistic will fall outside the 
range [-2M,M] that cannot be recovered by taking modulus 3M+1. In other words, the 
information will not be disclosed to study A if it uses the ‘artificial’ information. The modified 
steps include: 
1) In step3, study B generates a random integer r from a discrete uniform distribution 
U(0,3M) and adds encrypted r*(3M+1) to the encrypted 𝑁𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 − 2𝑁𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎.  
2) In step4, study A decrypts the result and calculates  𝑁𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 − 2𝑁𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎 + r*(3M+1) 
mod (3M+1) to get the true value of 𝑁𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 − 2𝑁𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎. 
Attack III: Aggregating information of multiple queries 
Suppose study A keeps sending queries to get comparisons between its query sample and a 
sample from study B, once it gets enough information for a certain sample j in study B, study A 
is able to disclose the genotype of sample j by solving a linear system (Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3: Attack on data of study B when study A gets enough information for a certain 





To guard our protocol against this attack, after step 2, study B should generate a random order of 
its samples and send permuted results for each query. Study A is blind to the permuted order. In 
other words, study A cannot match the result of each query for a particular sample in study B. 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the permutation process. In the modified scheme, study B protects its 
genotype from being disclosed while study A can still infer whether its sample has relatives in 
study B.  
 
Figure 4.4: Permutation step when sending encrypted results back. 𝑘𝑖,𝑗 represents the 
kinship coefficient for sample i in study A and sample j in study B. 
 
One concern is the missing information shared between studies may potentially reveal some 
identification information of samples of study B. If the missing pattern is quite unique to each 
individual in study B, study A can use it to arrange the permutated result back to the original 
order.  
In order to tackle this problem, study B should not share their missing information with study A; 
and study A should calculate an approximation of 𝑁𝐴𝑎
(𝑖)
 assuming no missing value in study B. 
Discussion about how ignoring the missing value in study B affects the genetic inference is 
shown in the Supplementary note 2. Through simulations we demonstrate that ignoring the 
missing information of study B will have negligible impact on the relationship inference 
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accuracy. Thus to prevent study A from identifying specific individual of study B in each query, 
we suggest study B not to share its missing information with study A.      
4.3 Results 
We evaluate the performance of this secure relationship inference protocol through several 
simulations. Again, relationship is inferred among the 14,572 samples of NHLBI TOPMed 
program Freeze3 data that we used in Chapter III. As introduced previously, BRAVO is the 
reference datasets of human genetic variation constructed based on TOPMed program (Taliun et 
al., 2019). Later in the data application, we will show how we apply the protocol to help with 
aggregating information of two similar reference datasets, BRAVO and gnomAD. 
4.3.1 Performance of identification of the genetic relatives in homogeneous 
populations 
The first simulation evaluates the protocol of inferring relationships when samples are having the 
same ethnic background. It assesses the number of variants that are needed to infer certain 
genetic relatives for our purpose of finding the overlapping samples between studies. The 
individual we use are exactly the same as Section 3.3.2, 3,357 Europeans, 3,437 Africans, 265 
Asian and 54 Native Americans. Then relationships are inferred within each ethnic group. Gold-
standard relationships among samples are inferred using KING based on ~600,000 HGDP 
variants which are considered to have high genotype quality (Cavalli-Sforza , 2005; Manichaikul 
et al. 2010). 
We select different numbers of variants to infer relationships using our secure protocol and 
compare the performance with the gold-standard. For each pair of samples, we assume the 
sample with smaller ID is from study A; it follows the protocol by encrypting its genotype of the 
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selected variants and decrypting the result to infer the relationship. The sample with larger ID is 
from study B; it calculates the encrypted result using encrypted data from study A and its own 
genotype.  
Analysis is conducted on independent 500, 1000, 5000 and 10000 variants with minor allele 
frequencies (MAFs) between 0.4 to 0.5. Again, to achieve our goal of identifying overlaps 
between the two studies, our primary concern is detecting duplicates and 1
st
 degree relatives.  
First of all, we compare the kinship coefficient calculated under our secure protocol with those 
calculated without encryption. The kinship coefficient obtained through the 
encryption/decryption process is identical as those calculated using the same genotypes without 
encryption. We demonstrate that through this protocol we successfully encrypt genotype data 
then successfully decrypt the results.  
Table 4.2 shows the number of relative pairs inferred totally and inferred correctly with different 
numbers of variants for each group. All of the duplicate pairs are correctly inferred using 500 or 
more variants. For 1
st
 degree relatives, we do not get false positive results in the Asian and 
Native American population. For the European and African population, the number of correctly 
identified relative pairs and the false discovery rate are comparable. For example, using 500 
variants, we are able to identify 99.08% of the 1
st
 degree relatives and get 2.56% false-positive 
pairs for Europeans while identify 99.32% 1
st
 degree relatives with 1.63% false-positive pairs for 
Africans. And we get ideal results that identify all the true 1
st
 degree relatives without any false 
positives using more than 5000 variants. 
When using more than 5000 variants, 2
nd
 degree relatives can also be identified with high 





degree relatives in Europeans with 5.07% FDR. In addition, we detect 98.19% of the 2
nd
 degree 
relatives in Africans with 1.72% FDR.  
Table 4.2: Number of relative pairs inferred with 500, 1000, 5000 and 10000 variants 
within each ethnic group. Data in the bracket represents number of correctly inferred pairs 
compared with gold-standard. 
 
European(N=3357) African(N=3437) Asian(N=265) American(N=54) 
Duplicates/MZ twins     
Gold standard 30 30 0 0 
500 30(30) 30(30) 0 0 
1000 30(30) 30(30) 0 0 
5000 30(30) 30(30) 0 0 
10000 30(30) 30(30) 0 0 
1
st
 degree relatives         
Gold standard 1959 1461 0 0 
500 1992(1941) 1475(1451) 0 0 
1000 1972(1951) 1461(1456) 0 0 
5000 1959(1959) 1462(1461) 0 0 
10000 1959(1959) 1461(1461) 0 0 
2
nd
 degree relatives       
Gold standard 2074 1049 1 0 
500 17904(1549) 20306(889) 195(0) 2(0) 
1000 2714(1723) 1638(807) 6(1) 0 
5000 2088(1954) 1045(1020) 1(1) 0 
10000 2090(1984) 1048(1030) 1(1) 0 
 
4.3.2 Performance of identification of the genetic relatives in a heterogeneous 
population 
The second simulation evaluates the protocol of inferring relationships securely in heterogeneous 
population. The simulation is conducted on all the 14,572 TOPMed samples with diverse ethnic 
background. In addition to those 7,113 samples with determined ancestry, 7,459 more samples 
are from other or admixed populations. Here, we assume the ancestry information is not known 
when inferring the relatives. Other simulation settings and procedures are the same as the 
previous simulation in homogeneous population. 
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Table 4.3 shows the number of relative pairs inferred in the heterogeneous population with 
different numbers of variants. All of the duplicate pairs are correctly inferred using 500 or more 
variants. For 1
st
 degree relatives, the number of correctly identified relative pairs increases and 
the false discovery rate decreases as we use more variants. We are able to identify 99.24% of the 
1
st
 degree relatives while getting 2.07% false-positive pairs using 500 variants. Using 10000 
variants, we are able to recover almost all of the 1
st
 degree relatives while control the FDR as 
low as 0.04%. When using more than 5000 variants, 2
nd
 degree relatives can also be identified. 
With 5000 variants, 95.70% of the 2
nd
 degree relatives are detected with 4.35% FDR.  With 
10000 variants, 97.35% of the 2
nd
 degree relatives are detected with 2.86% FDR.  
Table 4.3: Number of relative pairs inferred with 500, 1000, 5000 and 10000 variants in a 
heterogeneous population. 
Number  of variants Number of pairs 
Number of overlapping results with 
Gold-standard 
 Duplicates 
Gold-standard 108 108 
500 108 108 
1000 108 108 
5000 108 108 
10000 108 108 
 1
st
 degree relatives 
Gold-standard 8284 8284 
500 8395 8221 
1000 8315 8258 
5000 8285 8279 
10000 8286 8283 
 2
nd
 degree relatives 
Gold-standard 7444 7444 
500 142646 5667 
1000 11282 6320 
5000 7448 7124 




4.3.3 Selection of parameters for the encryption scheme 
As described before, the selection of parameters for the encryption scheme determines the utility, 
the security as well as the efficiency of the protocol. We have to define mainly 3 parameters for 
the SWHE scheme; polynomial modulus  𝑋𝑛 + 1, plaintext modulus t and coefficient modulus q. 
A standard deviation 𝜎 of the error distribution is also a parameter and it is fixed to be 3.19 in 
SEAL. In this simulation, we provide guidance about how to set the optimal parameters for the 
encryption scheme to guarantee the security and utility of this protocol and also make the 
protocol scale well in practice.  
The security is determined by both the polynomial modulus 𝑋𝑛 + 1 and the coefficient modulus 
q. The larger the n is, the more secure the scheme will be. On the contrary, the smaller the q is, 
the more secure the scheme will be. In SEAL, coefficient modulus q is composed of a product of 
multiple small primes 𝑞1 × . . . × 𝑞𝑘. SEAL provides the default value of parameters paris (n, q) 
for different security levels based on security level estimates (Chase et al., 2017). For 128-bits of 
security, if n is set to be 1024, q should be any product of those small primes but at most 29 bits 
long. If n is 2048, then q can be larger values of at most 56 bits long. For higher security level 
192-bits, smaller q should be used which is at most 39 bits when n is 2048.  
In terms of the utility of the scheme, we have to set proper q and plaintext modulus t to control 
the noise growth in ciphertext so that it can be decrypted successfully. Here t is set to be a power 
of 2. Bigger q and smaller t allows more complicated computations. In our protocol, inferring 
relationships with more variants requires a higher level of utility. As described previously, we 
have an upper boundary for q for certain security and n. To satisfy the utility demand, we have to 
set t as small as possible. However, t cannot be any small value. It has a lower bound which 
determines the range of the plaintext value. When calculating on more variants, the range of the 
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value of the statistic is larger that requires larger t. Therefore sometimes we have to increase q 
and n accordingly in order to meet the security and utility requirement. 
Larger n results in larger ciphertext sizes and slower operations. Even though there is no harm of 
using larger n in terms of security and utility, smaller n is always preferred in terms of achieving 
proficiency of the scheme. In Table 4.4, we show the optimal sets of parameters for different 
number of variants. Based on the simulation, they are the most efficient combination of 
parameters while also guarantee the security and utility of the encryption scheme. 
Table 4.4: Optimal set of parameters for homomorphic encryption under different security 
levels. 
Number  of variants 128-bits 192-bits 
 n q(bit) t n q(bit) t 
500 1024 29 210~212 2048 39 210~222 
1000 2048 56 212~230 2048 39 212~220 
5000 2048 56 214~230 2048 39 214~218 
10000 2048 56 216~230 2048 39 216~218 
 
4.3.4 Computational cost and bandwidth consumption of the protocol 
Table 4.5 and Supplementary Table S4.3 show the computing time of each primary step in the 
protocol under different scenarios. Results in Supplementary Table S4.3, demonstrate that the 
computing time of the encryption of an individual number is mainly determined by the degree of 
polynomial modulo n (for example, n=1024: 1.26ms vs. n=2048: 2.45ms). In addition, the 
computational time of the decryption of a number is also determined by n (for example, n=1024: 
0.12ms vs. n=2048: 0.24ms). Overall, the computational time of encryption and decryption 
scales relatively well in practice. If we have 10000 samples in study A and study B, for 500 
variants at 128-bits security level, the encryption and decryption take 7.0 CPU hours and 3.3 
CPU hours respectively (Table 4.5). 
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The main cost is the evaluation on the encrypted data. The evaluation conducted by study B 
includes two steps. The first step is to generate a pool of encrypted zeros. For our protocol, we 
set the size of the pool to be 25M. The first step of generating a pool of encrypted zeros is done 
once for all the comparisons. The second step is to calculate 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝑁𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 − 2𝑁𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎) +
∑ 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑚(0)
5𝑀
𝑚=1 . For each pair of comparisons, 5M encrypted zeros are randomly selected from 
the pool and added to the result to avoid potential information leakage of study B (illustrated in 
Section 4.2.5). Overall, with the function protection step, the computational time of evaluation 
scales well for 10000 variants. When we infer relationships among large cohorts, the evaluation 
overhead of step one can be neglected compared with the total evaluation time. For the analysis 
between two studies with 10000 samples each, the CPU hours for evaluation are 292.6 hours for 
500 variants and 3232.2 hours for 10000 variants.  
Table 4.5: Computational time of primary steps in the protocol with 128-bits of security. 
Number of 
variants 
Procedure Computational time 
CPU hours for 10000 
vs. 10000 comparison 
500 
Encryption  1.26ms/entry 7.0h 
Evaluation overhead* 16.08s 16.08s 
Evaluation 10.53ms/comparison 292.6h 
Decryption  0.12ms/comparison 3.3h 
1000 
Encryption  2.51ms/entry 27.9h 
Evaluation overhead* 63.57s 63.57s 
Evaluation 21.34ms/comparison 592.8h 
Decryption  0.26ms/comparison 7.2h 
5000 
Encryption  2.55ms/entry 141.7h 
Evaluation overhead* 320.78s 320.78s 
Evaluation 53.89ms/comparison 1497.0h 
Decryption  0.26ms/comparison 7.2h 
10000 
Encryption  2.52ms/entry  280.0h 
Evaluation overhead* 633.49s 633.49s 
Evaluation 116.63ms/comparison 3232.2h 
Decryption  0.18ms/comparison 5.0h 
* This step is to encrypt 25M zeros before the evaluation. Then 5M encrypted zeros are 
randomly selected to be added to the evaluation for function security. This step is only done one 
time by study B for all comparisons. 
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In terms of bandwidth consumption, the size of the encrypted data is determined by polynomial 
modulo parameter n. On average, each ciphertext requires 17kb to store when n equals 1024 and 
33kb to store when n equals 2048. This causes both studies to be burdened with heavy 
communication overhead. This overhead limits the number of samples we can compare within 
each communication. 
4.3.5 Application to combine TOPMed and gnomAD reference datasets 
As mentioned above, TOPMed program aims to provide reference resources of human genetic 
variation through a web browser, BRAVO. On BRAVO, variants summaries like allele 
frequencies (AFs) and quality metrics are shared to help researchers interpret the function of 
disease-causing variants. The current BRAVO browser is built upon 62,748 freeze5 TOPMed 
samples which have diverse backgrounds. 
The Genome Aggregation Database (gnomAD) is also a resource that provides similar summary 
information of variants as TOPMed (Lek et al., 2016). It aggregates and harmonizes both exome 
and genome sequencing data from a variety of large-scale sequencing projects. The data we use 
in this application are data for constructing its web browser which contains 123,136 exome 
sequenced individuals and 15,496 whole-genome sequenced individuals (Lek et al., 2016; 
Karczewski et al., 2019).  
Since BRAVO and gnomAD are designed for similar purposes and have similar content, 
researchers from both programs consent to aggregate information from both sides to construct a 
federated database. Since many studies participate in both programs, the overlapping samples 
may bias the summary statistics if we combine the two datasets directly. Thus in this application 




Relationships are inferred through the secure protocol we propose using 500 common variants at 
128-bits security level. The parameters we use for the encryption scheme are n = 1024, q = 29 
bits long and t = 210. To avoid the extreme heavy communication overhead of the comparison 
between 200,000 samples, we get the raw genotype of selected 500 common variants from both 
studies. Then the encryption-decryption process is conducted on one side. Overall, the 
encryption, evaluation and decryption procedures take 33 CPU hours, 25k CPU hours and 290 
CPU hours respectively. 
Overall, 5568 pairs of duplicates and 2269 pairs of 1
st
 degree relatives are detected between 
TOPMed and gnomAD. The overlapping samples are mainly from the studies that participate in 
both programs, including 2487 samples from Atrial Fibrillation Genetics Consortium, 1725 
samples from Framingham Heart Study and 1868 samples from Jackson Heart Study. 
4.4 Discussion 
Here, we propose a privacy preserving method in the context of KING and homomorphic 
encryption. This protocol allows us to address the inherent tension of data sharing privacy in 
personal genomics. Under this protocol, we are able to infer genetic relatives without exposing 
individual-level genetic data. The results are robust in the population with diverse ethnic 
background. In addition to the general data-sharing framework of homomorphic encryption, we 
modify the protocol according to the calculation of kinship coefficients and provide protection 
against several major attacks.  
The development of practical homomorphic encryption schemes provides us a chance to 
establish a two-party secure protocol for conducting genetic tests. While previous studies have 
shown its utility in conducting statistical tests for HWE, LD and genetic-disease associations in a 
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GWAS setting, the method to infer relatives based on this technique has not been well 
established. Even though methods that calculate edit distance or perform string search are able to 
find similar patients between studies, they are not scalable for our purpose of finding relatives 
between large-scale studies, since the problems they solve are much more complicated and have 
deeper circuits than the problem we consider here. To the best of our knowledge, the efficient 
method of calculation of the edit distance takes 15 to 100 seconds for a pair of 5000 variants 
(Kim and Lauter, 2015); the string search of a sequence of 25 variants in 2000 genomes takes 10 
seconds (Shimizu et al., 2016). None of these is applicable to our scenarios where both studies 
have more than 10000 samples. In our protocol, instead of comparing DNA sequences, we use a 
simpler summary statistic, kinship coefficient, to infer relatives. Thus, our protocol requires 
much less computing time for each comparison and scales well for large-scale studies. In 
addition, these existing methods can only infer duplicates while our method can infer relatives up 
to 2
nd
 degree. Moreover, these methods only protect data from one side, while we provide several 
layers of protection of the data on both sides.          
Another major asset of our protocol is the reliable performance in heterogeneous populations. 
Compared to the existing methods and the method proposed in Chapter III, our method can infer 
relationships robustly in a heterogeneous population without disclosing ancestry information 
between studies. Through simulations and an application on data from TOPMed and gnomAD 
program in a heterogeneous population, we demonstrate that we are able to recover most of the 
1
st
 degree relatives while controlling the false discovery rate well using a limited number of 
variants. The whole protocol scales well in practice with as many as 10000 variants.  
However, the protocol does suffer from heavy communication overhead. The large size of the 
ciphertext has been a general problem of all the practical methods based on homomorphic 
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encryption. To guarantee the security of the encryption scheme, both the degree of the 
polynomial and the coefficients are quite large and random. An efficient way to store the 
ciphertext may be difficult to develop. Some studies have demonstrated that a hybrid encryption 
scheme of homomorphic encryption and other encryption technique, for example Advanced 
Encryption Standard, may solve this common practical problem in homomorphic encryption 
(Naehrig et al. 2011; Olumide et al. 2015; Alkady et al. 2018). 
In conclusion, we propose a secure protocol that enables the relationship inference between 
studies without sharing individual level data. In the next chapter, we will discuss the limitations 
regarding the communication overhead that need further investigation to make the protocol more 
practical for large-scale studies. 
















Supplementary note 1: Robust relationship inference method previously described by 
Manichaikul et al (2010). 
Let 𝜙𝑖𝑗 denote the kinship coefficient between sample i and j, which is the probability of two 
alleles randomly selected from two individuals to be identical by descent. Let 𝜋0𝑖𝑗, 𝜋1𝑖𝑗, 𝜋2𝑖𝑗 
denote the probability that two individuals share 0,1 and 2 alleles identical by descent (IBD). 
They have the relationship 2𝜙𝑖𝑗 =
𝜋1𝑖𝑗
2
+ 𝜋2𝑖𝑗 . Supplementary Table S4.1 lists the probabilities 
for genotype pairs of bi-allelic variants given their IBD status. Then the marginal probability of 
genotype pairs can be represented by kinship coefficient: 
Pr(𝐴𝑎,  𝐴𝑎) = ∑ Pr(𝐴𝑎, 𝐴𝑎|𝐼𝐵𝐷) ∗ Pr (𝐼𝐵𝐷)𝐼𝐵𝐷=0,1,2 = 4𝑝
2𝑞2𝜋0𝑖𝑗 + 4𝑝𝑞𝜙𝑖𝑗                                                                                                        
and Pr(𝐴𝐴,  𝑎𝑎) = 2𝑝2𝑞2𝜋0𝑖𝑗. Therefore, 
𝐸(𝐼𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 − 2𝐼𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎) = Pr(𝐴𝑎, 𝐴𝑎) − 2 Pr(𝐴𝐴, 𝑎𝑎) = 4pq𝜙𝑖𝑗 
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Suppose the genotype score, defined by the number of the reference allele for individuals i, is 
𝑋(𝑖).The absolute value of the genotype difference , |𝑋(𝑖) − 𝑋(𝑗)|, takes three possible values: 2 




(𝑋(𝑖) − 𝑋(𝑗))2 = 4𝐼𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎 + 𝐼𝐴𝑎,𝑎𝑎 + 𝐼𝐴𝐴,𝐴𝑎 = 4𝐼𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎 + 𝐼𝐴𝑎
(𝑖) + 𝐼𝐴𝑎
(𝑗) − 2𝐼𝐴𝑎,𝐴𝑎 
Under the assumption of HWE, we have 𝐸(𝐼𝐴𝑎
(𝑖)) = Pr(𝐴𝑎) = 2𝑝𝑞. It follows that 
 𝐸(𝑋(𝑖) − 𝑋(𝑗)) 
2
= 4𝑝(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 2𝜙𝑖𝑗). 
 In the presence of population stratification, P may vary across individuals. To construct an 
estimator of kinship coefficient that is robust to population stratification, we assume P is a 
random variable representing AF of a randomly picked variant. P may vary across individuals 
but should follow the same distribution for a particular ancestry. Then the equation becomes 
𝐸(𝑋(𝑖) − 𝑋(𝑗))
2
= 4𝐸(𝑃(1 − 𝑃))(1 − 2𝜙𝑖𝑗). 
Under the assumption of HWE, we havePr(𝐴𝑎|𝑃) = 2𝑃(1 − 𝑃). Then 
𝐸(2𝑃(1 − 𝑃)) = 𝐸(Pr(𝐴𝑎|𝑃)) = 𝐸(𝐸(𝐼𝐴𝑎|𝑃)) = 𝐸(𝐼𝐴𝑎). 





𝑀𝑖𝑗 is the number of variants without missing value in both individuals. 
The robust estimator for 𝜙𝑖𝑗 is  

















In the paper, a more robust estimator is proposed to deal with a situation when the violation of 





they use min (𝑁𝐴𝑎
(𝑖)/𝑀𝑖𝑗 , 𝑁𝐴𝑎
(𝑗)
/𝑀𝑖𝑗) to estimate 𝐸(2𝑃(1 − 𝑃)). 
























Once the kinship coefficient is calculated, relationship can be inferred based on criteria in 
Supplementary Table S4.2. 
Supplementary Table S4.2: Relationship inference criteria for kinship coefficient. 
Relationship 𝝓  Inference criteria 𝝅𝟎 Inference criteria 
MZ twin >1/23/2 <0.1 
Parent-offspring (1/25/2, 1/23/2) <0.1 
Full-sib (1/25/2, 1/23/2) (0.1,0.365) 
Second degree relatives (1/27/2, 1/25/2) (0.365,1-1/23/2) 

















Supplementary note 2: The influence of ignoring missing value information on the 
estimation of kinship coefficient. 
To prevent study A from aggregating information of certain samples in study B, we proposed the 
strategy of permuting the sample order in each query (illustrated in Section 4.2.5). However, we 
have a concern that the missing information shared between studies may potentially reveal some 
identification information of samples of study B. To add another layer of protection on this 
protocol, study B should consider not sharing their missing information with study A. In other 





(𝑗) , study A should 










 is calculated assuming study B has no missing value. Later, we call the kinship 
coefficient considering missing value in study B, the exact kinship coefficient; and the kinship 
coefficient ignoring missing value in study B, the approximate kinship coefficient.   
Simulation was conducted on 1,000 selected TOPMed samples. These samples included 117 
samples that consist of all the 108 pairs of duplicates, 400 samples having 1
st
 degree relationship 
and 483 samples having 2
nd
 degree relationship or being unrelated. The set of variants we used 
for relationship inference was exactly the same as the simulation in Section 4.3. The relationship 
was inferred by exact kinship coefficient as well as approximate kinship coefficient. We 
compared their relationship inference accuracy through true predicted value (TPV) and the false 
discovery rate (FDR). The TPV and FDR were calculated by comparing the results with the gold 
standard we described in Section 4.3.   
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Ignoring 0.2% missing value in real data 
We did the simulation first based on the real TOPMed data. The missing rate across the variants 
per sample is about 0.2% for all the settings, 500, 1000, 5000 or 10000 variants.  
The relationship inferred using the exact kinship coefficient is identical to using the approximate 
kinship coefficient under all the setting.  
Ignoring 5% missing value in simulated data     
In the first simulation, we show that not sharing missing value information of study B has no 
negative impact when the missing rate is low. Here we consider a situation where the missing 
rate is high. We simulated data by randomly masking the real data as missing with the 
probability of 0.05. Then relationship was inferred using the exact and approximate kinship 
coefficients. 
Results are shown in Supplementary Table S4.3. The results using approximate kinship 
coefficient are similar as those using exact kinship coefficient. With more than 5000 variants, the 
results are identical using these two kinship coefficients. As illustrated in Supplementary Figure 
S4.1, the approximate kinship coefficient underestimates the kinship coefficient because 𝑁𝐴𝑎
(𝑖)∗
is 
larger than  𝑁𝐴𝑎
(𝑖)
. Relative pairs having kinship coefficient around the 0.354, 0.177 and 0.0884 
cutoff are likely to be misclassified.  
In conclusion, the impact of ignoring missing information of study B is negligible regardless of 
the missing rate. To infer relationship with our secure protocol, study B can keep its missing 





Supplementary Table S4.3: Inference accuracy using exact kinship coefficient vs. using 
approximated kinship coefficient.   
 
Number of variants TPV* FDR** 
Duplicates 
  
Exact kinship coefficient 
500 100.00% 5.26% 
1000 100.00% 0.00% 
5000 100.00% 0.00% 
10000 100.00% 0.00% 
Approx. kinship coefficient 
500 100.00% 5.26% 
1000 100.00% 0.00% 
5000 100.00% 0.00% 
10000 100.00% 0.00% 
1
st
 degree relatives 
  
Exact kinship coefficient 
500 85.59% 16.53% 
1000 86.36% 13.64% 
5000 84.55% 15.45% 
10000 85.05% 14.95% 
Approx. kinship coefficient 
500 85.59% 15.83% 
1000 86.36% 13.64% 
5000 84.55% 15.45% 
10000 85.05% 14.95% 
2
nd
 degree relatives 
  
Exact kinship coefficient 
500 71.43% 97.90% 
1000 59.57% 82.61% 
5000 68.89% 38.00% 
10000 72.73% 25.58% 
Approx. kinship coefficient 
500 69.39% 97.57% 
1000 59.57% 77.95% 
5000 68.89% 36.73% 
10000 72.73% 25.58% 
*TPV (true predictive value) = number of pairs inferred correctly/number of true pairs 








Supplementary Figure S4.1: Kinship coefficients calculated by considering vs. ignoring missing information of study B. Grid 
corresponding to threshold of defining duplicates, 1
st
 degree relatives and 2
nd
 degree relatives (0.354, 0.177, 0.0884). Red dots are 
misclassified 1
st
 degree relative pairs resulting from ignoring missing value. Green dots are misclassified 2
nd
 degree relative pairs 























128 1024 10 1.26ms 16.08s 10.53ms 0.12ms 17kb 
128 1024 12 1.29ms 16.21s 7.21ms 0.14ms 17kb 
192 2048 10 2.45ms 30.73s 11.73ms 0.24ms 33kb 
192 2048 22 2.46ms 31.02s 13.61ms 0.24ms 33kb 
1000 
128 2048 12 2.51ms 63.57s 21.34ms 0.26ms 33kb 
128 2048 30 2.42ms 61.27s 21.05ms 0.25ms 33kb 
192 2048 12 2.34ms 59.50s 20.03ms 0.24ms 33kb 
192 2048 20 2.38ms 60.21s 21.01ms 0.21ms 33kb 
5000 
128 2048 14 2.55ms 320.78s 53.89ms 0.26ms 33kb 
128 2048 30 2.43ms 303.82s 59.06ms 0.23ms 33kb 
192 2048 14 2.15ms 269.02s 52.99ms 0.18ms 33kb 
192 2048 18 2.17ms 271.40s 55.32ms 0.19ms 33kb 
10000 
128 2048 16 2.52ms 633.49s 116.63ms 0.18ms 33kb 
128 2048 30 2.41ms 602.71s 103.00ms 0.18ms 33kb 
192 2048 16 2.26ms 565.98s 110.96ms 0.19ms 33kb 
192 2048 18 2.24ms 561.17s 108.45ms 0.20ms 33kb 
* This step is to encrypt 25M zeros before the evaluation. Then 5M encrypted zeros is randomly selected to be added to the evaluation 









Summary and Future Work 
5.1 Summary 
Motivated by the genetic studies of electronic health records (EHR), this dissertation has focused 
on developing applicable methodologies to deal with the challenges of analyzing large-scale 
EHR data. Since EHR, originally, was not designed for scientific research, one critical drawback 
of using EHR for GWAS is the potential misclassification of phenotypes. Ignoring this 
misclassification will lead to biased association results and have a negative impact on the 
downstream analysis. Driven by this concern, we developed a method in Chapter II that can 
estimate the misclassification by examining external GWAS information. In addition, 
aggregating information between different EHR studies that have data sharing barriers requires 
privacy-preserving methods for relationship inference. This demand motivated the development 
of methods in Chapters III and IV. We proposed two secure protocols that can infer duplicates 
and genetic relatives between studies without sharing individual-level data.We believe these 
newly developed methods and protocols will facilitate analysis of genetic data along with EHR, 
and provide insight into future genetics research. However, each of the methods has both 
advantages and limitations, as will be described in this chapter. Moreover, they can be further 
improved to be more applicable to a broader range of problems. Therefore, we conclude this 
dissertation by pointing out potential directions for future research.
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5.1.1 Modeling misclassification in phenotypes in EHR  
One major challenge in EMR-based GWAS and PheWAS is the difficulty in accurately 
annotating disease phenotypes, which results from the low accuracy of billing codes as well as 
the difficulty of pooling billing codes to binary case/control phenotypes. Previous studies have 
demonstrated that ICD codes often have limited accuracy in predicting the true underlying 
disease status (Bazarian  et al., 2006; Liao et al., 2010). In the analysis of the Michigan Genomic 
Initiative (MGI) data, we detected significant misclassification in age-related macular 
degeneration (AMD), psoriasis and type II diabetes (T2D) while no significant misclassification 
was detected in breast cancer. In Section 2.5, we noted that the misclassification can either occur 
along the translation from ICD codes to the dichotomized phenotypes or the assignment of ICD 
codes to patients. The possible errors in ICD codes introduced by O’Malley et al. (2005), such as 
the ambiguous description of ICD codes, the miscommunication between patients and clinicians, 
and the upcoding of ICD codes, all can explain the high misclassification we observe in MGI 
data. In addition, the observation by O’Malley et al., that a disease for which tests have high 
sensitivity will have higher diagnostic accuracy and smaller error in the ICD codes, explains the 
low misclassification of breast cancer in MGI. Our method provides researchers with guidance in 
tracing the origin of the errors and improving the case definition scheme.  
Other than improving the phenotype construction, the estimation of our model, i.e. the 
misclassification rate, can be used to correct results in downstream analyses directly. First we 
can correct the effect size estimation with the misclassification rate using the formula derived by 
Neuhaus (1999) or Duffy's approach (2004), or using the iteratively reweighted least square 
algorithm (Magder and Hughes, 1997). In Chapter II, we corrected the effect size estimation for 
some variants associated with AMD, using Duffy’s method, and saw the convergence of the 
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corrected results to the external GWAS. In the future, if applying the correction on the whole 
genome, we may recover the power of finding novel signals since the effect sizes are pulling 
against the null hypothesis. In addition, the misclassification rate can also be used to correct the 
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve analysis (Zawistowski et al.,2017).   
5.1.2 Two relationship inference protocols 
In Chapters III and IV, we proposed two protocols that can infer genetic relatives without 
compromising privacy. Although the methods were initially motivated by the demand of 
aggregating information between variant browsers, they can be applied to solve a broader range 
of problems when inferring relationships between studies is needed. Another promising direction 
is to use these methods for meta-analyses. Overlapping samples are found in meta-analysis when 
publicly available controls are shared among different studies (Young et al. 2007) or the same 
cohort contributes to different GWAS in a meta-analysis (Bonàs-Guarch et al. 2017). 
Overlapping samples can lead to inflated type I errors and false signals so that in case-control 
studies, the removal of related individuals is a standard quality control step (Voight and Pritchard, 
2005). However, it can be challenging to remove overlapping samples in a meta-analysis, since 
individual-level data cannot be shared. Using our protocol, we will be able to identify the close 
relatives among different GWAS in a meta-analysis, then account for the overlaps using existing 
methods (Lin and Sullivan, 2009).    
While the first protocol uses summary statistics to encrypt genotype data and uses a likelihood 
model to infer relationships, the second protocol uses homomorphic encryption to guarantee the 
security of the data and makes inference based on a robust method implemented in KING. They 
share some similarities in terms of utility. With 500 properly selected variants, both protocols 
have the ability to identify most of the 1
st
 degree relatives with a low false discovery rate. With 
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5000 or more variants, 2
nd
 degree relatives can be inferred potentially with low false discovery 
rate.  
In addition to the similarities, both protocols have pros and cons compared with the other under 
different scenarios (Table 5.1). The first protocol is more computationally efficient. For the 
10000 samples comparison, the first protocol takes less than 25 CPU hours while the best case 
for the second protocol is about 300 CPU hours, ignoring the communication overhead. The first 
protocol also scales well in bandwidth consumption. While the first protocol only requires MB-
level of data communication, the second protocol requires hundreds of GB- or even TB- level of 
data communication overhead between studies. 
However, the second protocol also has some obvious advantages. First of all, it can make robust 
inferences of relationships in a heterogeneous population. Especially when ancestry information 
is not available for selecting variants with consistent allele frequencies (AFs), the first protocol 
will have many false discoveries due to the biased AFs while the second protocol is robust to 
such bias. In addition, the second protocol encrypts genotypes with a higher level of security. 
Homomorphic encryption, as a well-established encryption scheme, has rigorous proof of the 
security level under different settings (Chase et al., 2017). The mapping between the encrypted 
value and the true value is totally random. Given the encrypted value, the corresponding true 
value can be any integers with equal probabilities. For the first protocol, on the other hand, the 
N-to-1 mapping between the encrypted value and the true value is fixed. Therefore given an 
encrypted value, the space to search for the true value is limited, which makes this protocol less 
secure than the second one.  
In conclusion, the two methods are preferred under different scenarios. For inference in the 
homogenous population, one may consider using the method in Chapter III, which is more 
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efficient, while one may consider using the method in Chapter IV for the heterogeneous 
population and when higher level of security is required.  
Table 5.1: Comparison between two relationship inference protocols proposed in Chapters 
III and IV. 
  Chapter III Chapter IV 
Utility (Inference 
accuracy)* 
European: TPV = 99.94%,  
              FDR = 0.11%;  
Het. Pop.**: TPV = 100%, 
                FDR = 0.15%   
European: TPV = 99.93%,  
              FDR = 0.07%;  
Het. Pop.: TPV = 100%,  
           FDR = 0%   
Security  
Summary statistics: fixed N-to-1 
mapping between the value before and 
after encryption 
HE: random mapping between the 
value before and after encryption 
Computation time*** 25h 300h 
Communication 
overhead*** 
6MB from A to B 
324GB from A to B;  




Not robust, need to select variants with 
consistent AF across different 
populations 
Robust 
* Relationship inferred using 5000 variants 
** Using selected 5000 variants based on AF 
*** For 10000 vs. 10000 comparisons with 500 variants   
 
 
5.2 Limitations and future work 
One promising extension of the method in Chapter II is to deal with the misclassification 
between different cases and between cases and controls at the same time. For instance, it is very 
likely that T1D and T2D phenotypes are mixed in EHR because their ICD-9 code are quite 
similar (250.01, 250.03, 250.05, …, 250.93 for T1D and 250.00, 250.02, …, 250.92 for T2D) 
(Kho et al., 2011; Richesson et al., 2013). Other than considering additional information like 
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diagnostic lab tests to distinguish them, we can use a similar idea as what we proposed in 
Chapter II: examining genotype information of disease-associated variants.  We can extend our 
model by incorporating another misclassification rate parameter that quantifies the 
misclassification between these two cases. Future development of methods dealing with 
misclassification between cases like T1D and T2D using genotype information will bring about 
more powerful and reliable genetic research using EHR data. 
As discussed in Chapter II, our model is based on the assumption that the external GWAS is the 
gold-standard for the EHR GWAS. In other words, when the EHR and external GWAS have 
different underlying disease liability thresholds to dichotomize case/controls, those discrepancies 
due to the different threshold are also treated as a misclassification in our model. Taking 
psoriasis as an example, the GWAS of the purpose-built cohorts with dermatologist-diagnosed 
phenotypes usually only dichotomize the severe plaque type psoriasis as the case while the EHR 
GWAS treats patient with all kinds of psoriasis  (Tsoi et al., 2017). Those differences are 
interpreted as misclassification in our model and cannot be separated from the true control-to-
case misclassification. A method that can distinguish these two kinds of misclassification will be 
a promising future direction. It can benefit the interpretation of the results and help researchers to 
trace the source of misclassification.  
Moreover, since the primary goal of Chapter II is to get accurate estimation of misclassification 
rate, we do not focus on the inference of the estimate. The mixed chi-square does not calibrate 
the likelihood ratio test statistic well under certain scenarios. A nonparametric bootstrap test has 
been shown in some research to have better performance than the asymptotic likelihood ratio test 
for testing parameters on the boundary (Cavaliere et al., 2017). In the future, we may consider 
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using this technique to control the inflated type I error and improve the inference of the 
misclassification rate. 
For the two relationship inference protocols in Chapters III and IV, we did not evaluate their 
performance of identifying relatives of higher degrees, since our ultimate objective in this 
dissertation is to find the overlapping samples between studies. The methods, in the future, can 
be extended to infer any degree of relatives so that they can deal with a more general problem. 
Inspired by the method proposed by Epstein in 2000, we can build the likelihood-based protocol 
based on the hidden Markov model (HMM) considering the recombination probability between 
variants so that more precise relationships can be inferred. In addition, the single-nucleotide 
polymorphism microarray and the whole-genome sequencing enable more accurate detection of 
IBD segments and more precise resolution of IBD segment boundaries. Thus, multiple methods 
taking advantage of local IBD segment data have increased the range of detectable relationships 
up to 8
th
 degree (Huff et al., 2011; Li et al., 2014). By developing an encryption method for 
variants with higher density, we may achieve the goal of securely identifying higher degree 
relatives.    
In order to infer higher degree relatives, more variants should be examined. The demand of 
incorporating more variants into the model generates another critical future direction of our 
protocols, improving computational efficacy. Sample sizes of recent research are exploding. For 
example, both the latest TOPMed and gnomAD freeze each have more than 100k samples and 
the UK Biobank, as described before, contains around 500k samples (Bycroft et al., 2018). As 
datasets continue to increase in size, we have to guarantee that our protocol is computationally 
feasible to deal with large-scale data. This can be overcome by taking advantage of the up-to-
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date development of cryptography techniques, such as implementing more efficient 
homomorphic encryption techniques (Wang et al., 2018). 
Last but not least, the protocol based on homomorphic encryption requires excessive 
communication bandwidth for large-scale studies. Both the degree of the polynomial and the 
coefficients are quite large and random for homomorphic encrypted ciphertext. As a 
consequence, an efficient way to store the ciphertext has been hard to develop. That is why there 
has not been much research in this area, even though this problem of homomorphic encryption is 
very common in real life settings. One potential solution is to hybrid homomorphic encryption 
with other encryption techniques that have much smaller ciphertext size, for example Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES). The idea of the hybrid is that one study encrypts the data with AES 
rather than homomorphic encryption and then encrypts the AES key using homomorphic 
encryption, which means that calculation on the other side can be conducted by first decrypting 
the data from AES with encrypted AES key. Some studies have demonstrated that this strategy 
can solve certain kinds of practical problems in homomorphic encryption (Naehrig et al. 2011; 
Olumide et al. 2015; Alkady et al. 2018). We would like to address this important issue in the 
future by leveraging the knowledge accumulated through the development of this dissertation. 
5.3 Closing remarks 
Over the last decade, electronic health records have proved instrumental to unraveling the 
genetic complexities of disease risks. In particular, EHR-based GWAS and PheWAS are 
increasingly being used for locus replication as well as discovery of novel variants associated 
with complex diseases. The sequencing data being linked to EHR, in addition, expands the usage 
of EHR and helps with the functional interpretation of disease causing variants. One key 
advantage of using EHR is to boost study power by increasing the sample sizes of the association 
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study at low cost. However, challenges like misclassification in the phenotype as well as the 
concern of security when sharing data between studies need to be addressed.   
Based upon this concept, by combining interdisciplinary knowledge of statistics, computer 
science, biology and medical science, my thesis first proposes a method to measure the 
misclassification in EHR-based GWAS and PheWAS analysis in order to reduce the bias in the 
search for disease-genetic associations and enhances the power of the analysis of the genomic 
basis of human disease. Then privacy preserving protocols are proposed to securely infer 
overlapping samples studies. It enables the accurate aggregation of information between studies, 
which not only can make the functional interpretation of putative disease-causing variants more 
precise but also can help avoiding spurious association results in meta-analysis. The continued 
expansion of GWAS, and its integration with the molecular functional interpretation, will be a 
critical asset for the study of gene coding and regulatory mechanisms and how they contribute to 
complex diseases. The subsequent downstream analysis that identifies biological pathways will 
provide information of suitable targets for drug development and repositioning of known 
therapeutics. Continuing steps toward filling the knowledge gap between genetics and disease 
will bring us closer to elucidating disease etiology and contribute to the development of 
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